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CHAPTER I 
Il\'TRODUCTION 
The Problem 
In an era of increased public scrutiny and accountability, hind-
sightful evaluations of others' decisions are frequently required. This 
study was designed to investigate the very assumption that underlies 
the fair evaluation of others' decisions, namely, that people can per-
ceive how a situation was experienced rather than how it should have 
been experienced given the illumination of hindsight. 
The fairness or objectivity of second-guessing is a crucial issue 
for professionals or experts called upon to make decisions that affect 
other people. Some of the professionals more frequently and publically 
challenged include political leaders, economists, educators, physicians, 
psychologists, police officers, and baseball managers. When second-gu-
essed by hindsightful observers, "mistakes" for members of these and 
other groups can be interpreted as incompetence, negligence, or worse. 
The objectivity of second-guessing is also a crucial issue for 
those who are called upon to objectively assess the judgment of others. 
Our legal strategy for evaluating people's judgment relies almost exclu-
sively on the hindsight of some to judge the foresight of others. Yet 
it may be that cognitive biases associated with hindsight preclude the 
required objectivity. Thus, the very system we designed to enhance 
objectivity may actually minimize that objectivity and consequently, 
the justice that is served. 
1 
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The Fallibility of Predictive Judgment 
Much of the early research on predictive judgment was marked by a 
distinctive rationalistic bias. It was assumed that people relied on 
mathematically optimal strategies for all their judgment needs. Accord-
ing to this view, errors in judgment resulted from one of two things. 
Either there were accidental errors due to problems with the information 
or there was cognitive interference from some irrational motives or 
needs (Fischhoff, 1976; Hammond,McClelland, & Mumpower, 1980; Taylor, 
1982). 
Meehl' s (1954) classic monograph first reviewed evidence to show 
that linear combinations of information outperform the intuitive judg-
ments of clinicians in behavioral prediction. Meehl's observations were 
controversial, attracting much interest in the study of predictive judg-
ment in a variety of contexts (Wiggins, 1973). None of the subsequent 
studies that focused on clinical and statistical prediction were able 
to demonstrate clinical superiority (Dawes, 1976; Goldberg, 1968; Gough, 
1962; Sawyer, 1966). Moreover, later studies of predictive judgment 
were able to document a disconcerting lack of judgmental accuracy across 
task and situational factors with a variety of subject populations 
(e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981;Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Szucko & Kleinmuntz, 1981). Perhaps 
even more disturbing were the additional findings that people, experts 
and non-experts alike, maintained great confidence in their fallible 
judgment (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichten-
stein, 1977; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, 1982; Lichtenstein & Fisch-
hoff, 1977; Oskamp, 1982). 
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Because of the rapidly diminishing empirical support for the 
rationalistic approach to the study of judgment, a major shift occurred 
in the literature towards the study of predictable departures from opti-
mality (Abelson & Levi, 1985; Hammond et al., 1980; Markus & Zajonc, 
1985). Kahneman and Tversky (1973,1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1971,1982a,1982b,1983) traced some of the predictable errors in judgment 
to the use of heuristics or simplication strategies. For instance, they 
found that the "availability" of information influenced judgment. Spe-
cifically, if people could think of several instances of one kind of 
event as compared to another, they were inclined to think that the for-
mer event occurs more frequently than the latter. Sometimes the use of 
heuristics is valid. For example, it is often true that instances of 
more frequent events, such as losing baseball seasons in Chicago, are 
recalled more easily than instances of less frequent events, (i.e., win-
ning seasons). Other times, however, it can lead to systematic biases. 
For instance, the use of the availability heuristic has been associated 
with the overestimation of well-publicized events, such as deaths due to 
homocide or cancer, and the underestimation of less well-publicized 
events, such as deaths due to asthma and diabetes (Lichtenstein, Slavic, 
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). 
The work of Kahneman and Tversky inspired a wealth of research on 
systematic biases in predictive judgment. This work documented a series 
of biases associated specifically with the estimation of outcome prob-
abilities. For instance, when estimating outcomes, people have been 
found to disregard base-rate information (Bar-Hillel, 1973; Nisbett & 
Borgida, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a), to be generally oblivious to 
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questions of sample size (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1974), to overweigh 
positive occurrences of an event more than non-occurrences (Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1978; Estes-, 1976), to seek and retain information that con-
firms an impression and to disregard or forget information that is dis-
confirmatory (Beyth & Fischhoff, 1977; Cohen, 1981; Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1978; Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweeney, 1977; Snyder, Campbell, & Preston, 
1982; Snyder & Cantor, 1979; Snyder & Swann, 1978), and to overestimate 
the probability of related events occurring together (Bar-Hil-
lel, 1973 ;Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Fischhoff ,Slavic, & Lichtenstein, 
1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b). 
Hindsight Bias 
The Phenomenon 
One bias that this work identified, which has both theoretical and 
practical significance, has been labeled hindsight bias, creeping deter-
minism, or the knew-it-all- along effect (Fischhoff, 1975a,1975b,1977). 
Hindsight bias, as it will be called here, refers to certain judgmental 
distortions that result once people have been informed of the outcome to 
a situation. First, the particular outcome seems, with hindsight, to be 
inevitable. Second, people not only tend to view the outcome as inevi-
table, but also view it as having appeared "relatively inevitable" 
before it happened. That is, they see direct relationships between cer-
tain preceding events and what eventuated. Third, people underestimate 
the effect that outcome information has on their predictions. They mis-
remember their own foresightful predictions so as to exaggerate in hind-
sight what they actually reported knowing in foresight. Finally, people 
5 
wrongly estimate that those without benefit of hindsight have the same 
predictive capabilities as those with hindsight. (Fisch-
hoff, 1975a, 1975b, 1977; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1975; Wood, 1978). 
Moreover, the distortions associated with hindsight bias have been found 
to be strongest for events initially judged to be the least plausible 
(Arkes,~ortman,Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Fischhoff, 1977; Wood, 1978). 
Fischhoff (1975a,1975b), who pioneered this line of inquiry, first 
demonstrated the effect of outcome information on individual pre-
dictions. In a prototypical experiment, all subjects were first given a 
passage to read. Subjects had been randomly assigned to conditions 
with various outcome information included at the end of the passage. 
Control subjects received no outcome information. After reading the 
material, all subjects were asked to make probability judgments about 
the likelihood of certain outcomes occurring "as if they did not know 
what happened." Hindsight bias was evidenced when the probabilities 
assigned to an outcome were higher among those who read of that particu-
lar outcome than among those who had no knowledge of that outcome occur-
ing. 
For example, in one experiment, Fischhoff (1975a) had subjects 
read an unfamiliar historical passage describing the beginning of a 
struggle between the British colonials and the Gurkhas of Nepal in 1814. 
The passage told of some minor defeats suffered by the British but 
excluded any information about the ultimate victor. Subjects were then 
asked to make probabilistic predictions concerning several mutually 
exclusive outcomes including British victory, Gurkha victory, military 
stalemate with no peace settlement, and military stalemate with a peace 
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settlement. Subjects were also asked to indicate which statements in 
the passage were particularily relevant to their predictions. Hindsight 
bias was apparent when subjects who were told of a Gurkha victory, for 
instance, perceived it as more likely than those who were given either 
no outcome information or different outcome information. 
In the same study, relevance attributed to any datum was found to 
be highly dependent on which outcome subjects believed to have occurred. 
If the item was supportive of the outcome's occurrence, then it was more 
likely to be considered relevant. For example, the item "the British 
officers learned caution only after sharp reverses" was considered the 
most relevant statement by subjects informed of a British victory; this 
statement was considered comparatively irrelevant by subjects who read 
of other outcomes and by subjects who received no outcome information. 
In another early study of hindsight bias, subjects were asked to 
make probabilistic predictions concerning current events rather than 
historic scenarios (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). Immediately before former 
President Nixon's 1972 trip to China and the USSR, subjects were asked 
to predict 15 possible outcomes,including, for example, the chances that 
the USA would establish a permanent diplomatic mission in Peking or that 
the USA and USSR would agree to a joint space program. Some time after 
the actual Nixon visit, subjects were unexpectedly asked to recall their 
predictions. Results showed that subjects recalled probabilistic pre-
dictions that were higher than their original predictions for the events 
they believed had actually occurred and lower for those that they 
believed had not occurred. (Subjects were not always accurate in their 
recollections of the events that had actually occurred.) In other 
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words, subjects recalled being much more clairvoyant than was actually 
the case. 
Explanations of Hindsight Bias 
The early studies of hindsight bias demonstrated clearly that out-
come information biased predictive judgment and that people were largely 
unaware of falling prey to the bias. Were these findings indicative of 
a cognitive bias or were there motivational, artifactual, or situational 
reasons for the predictive distortions? Results from subsequent 
research pointed convincingly to a cognitive interpretation of hindsight 
bias with little or no support for alternative explanations. For 
instance, a series of motivational interpretations were consistently not 
supported by experimental results. Fischhoff (1977) examined whether 
hindsight bias represented the result of people having, but not apply-
ing, the appropriate cognitive talent. Specifically,he tried to elimi-
nate hindsight bias by exhorting subjects to work harder. Before 
beginning their task, subjects were told: "Your responses are extremely 
important to us. The effort you invest in them will largely determine 
the value of our subsequent study. Please devote as much attention to 
this task as you can. Thank you." This manipulation was unsuccessful 
in reducing the predictive distortions resulting from outcome informa-
tion. 
In a more direct attempt to counter any motivational influences, 
Fischhoff (1977) explicity warned subjects about the hindsight bias ten-
dency. The specific instructions read: 
On previous occasions in which we have given people this task, we 
have found that they exaggerate how much they have known without 
being told the answer. You might call this an I-knew-it-all-along 
effect. 
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Consider, for example, the following question. Adaptive radi-
ation refers to (a) evolutionary changes in animal life toward 
increased specialization or (b) the movement of animals to a more 
suitable environment for survival. A group of people who were told 
that the correct answer was (a) believed that they would have 
assigned a probability of . 60 to (a). A group of people who were 
not told the answer believed that the item was a toss-up. They 
assigned a probability of .SO to (a). Another group of people who 
were told that the correct answer was (a) believed that they would 
have assigned a probability of .40 to (b), the incorrect answer. 
Again, people who were not told the answer assigned a probability of 
.50 to (b). As you can see, people who were told the answer to an 
item assigned a higher probability to the correct answer or a lower 
probability to the incorrect answer than they might have if they had 
not been told the answer. 
In completing the questionnaire, please do everything you can 
to avoid this bias. One reason why it happens is that people who 
are told the correct answer find it hard to imagine how they ever 
could have believed in the incorrect one. In answering, make cer-
tain that you haven't forgotten any reasons that you might have 
thought of in favor of the wrong answer - had you not been told that 
it was wrong. In addition to figuring out how the correct answer 
fits in with whatever else you know about each topic, devote some 
attention to trying to see how the incorrect answer might have fit 
in. 
At the other extreme, however, be careful not to overcorrect 
and sell yourself short by underestimating how much you would have 
known without the answer. (pp. 354-355) 
After reading this warning, subjects were just as likely as other hind-
sightful observers who did not read the warning to overestimate their 
predictive capabilities. 
Still other motivationally-based explanations of hindsight bias 
have been explored, such as the hypothesis that subjects retrospectively 
claim better predictive capabilities to enhance their self-esteem or the 
hypothesis that people distort their public predictions as a self-pres-
entation strategy (Leary, 1981,1982). Neither hypothesis was supported. 
While Leary found clear evidence of hindsight distortion, he found no 
evidence of any apparent mediating effects of self-esteem or self-pres-
entation factors. 
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Experimental conditions have also been designed to test the rela-
tionship between other self-presentation factors and hindsight bias. 
For example, experimental tasks have been presented as memory exercises 
rather than tests of general knowledge (Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff & 
Beyth, 1975; Wood, 1978), assuming that subjects would feel less self-
conscious about a poor memory than poor judgment. Subjects have also 
been asked to answer as foresightful peers would answer, on the assump-
tion that there would be no particular motivation to overstate what 
their peers would know (Fischhoff, 1975a; Wood, 1978). Neither manipu-
lation reduced the hindsight effect. 
Along with these attempts to detect motivational sources of hind-
sight bias, the possibility that the hindsight phenomenon resulted from 
certain demand characteristic effects was also explored. For instance, 
Wood (1978) designed a series of experiments to assess a demand-charac-
teristic interpretation of the effect. Subjects, whether students or 
surgeons, may consciously choose to use outcome information in an effort 
to please the experimenter. The "right" answer in prediction tasks may 
simply be too hard to ignore. Although it may be impossible to elimi-
nate all demand- characteristic effects, Wood attempted to minimize 
their influence by specifically encouraging subjects to recall their 
foresightful predictions rather than reporting what seemed most likely 
from the outcome. Despite this instruction, Wood found clear evidence of 
hindsight bias. 
Although neither motivational nor presentational interpretations 
have been supported, there is the possibility that various experimental 
artifacts might be contributing to the predictive distortions associated 
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with outcome information. To investigate this possibility, there were a 
series of studies varying certain task or situational factors. None of 
these efforts eliminated or reduced the bias. For instance, variations 
in experimental context have not eliminated the effect. Hindsight bias 
has been demonstrated with diverse experimental materials including his-
torical events (Fischhoff, 1975a), psychotherapy case histories (Fisch-
hoff, 1975a), facts of general knowledge (Wood, 1978), outcomes of sci-
entific experiments (Slavic & Fischhoff, 1977) medical diagnoses (Arkes 
et al. ,1981), and employment-related incidents (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981) 
Variations in certain task factors have also failed to undo the 
bias. Fischhoff (1982b) described the following range of failed 
attempts to manipulate task factors and thus reduce hindsight bias: 
substituting rating-scale judgments of "surprisingness" for prob-
ability assessments (Slavic & Fischhoff, 1977); using more homogene-
ous items to allow fuller evocation of one set of knowledge, rather 
than using general-knowledge questions scattered over a variety of 
content areas, none of which might be thought about very deeply 
(Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975); trying to dispel doubts about the 
nature of the experiment (Wood, 1978); using contemporary events 
that judges have considered in foresight prior to making their hind-
sight judgments (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975); ... separating subjects 
in time from the report of the event, in hopes of reducing its ten-
dency to dominate their perceptual field (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; 
Wood, 1978); ... having subjects assess the likelihood of the 
reported event's recurring rather than the likelihood of its happen-
ing in the first place, in the hope that uncertainty would be more 
available in the forward- looking perspective (Mitchell & Kalb, 
1981; Slavic & Fischhoff, 1977). (pp. 428-429) 
Hindsight bias has appeared across still more diverse experimental 
parameters, including conditions that contrast whether hindsight sub-
jects perform hypothetical or straightforward judgments and whether the 
antecedent events are presented in greater or lesser detail (Slovic & 
Fischhoff, 1977). Hindsight bias also withstood variations in instruc-
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tional sets, conditions with and without preoutcome judgments, and con-
ditions with different statement sets (Wood, 1978). 
Given the numerous failed attempts to minimize hindsight bias, 
other research efforts were directed at learning more about the cogni-
tive factors associated with the bias. For example, although experts 
have been found to be susceptible to cognitive biases in judgment 
(Casscells, Schoenberger, & Graboys, 1978; Chapman & Chapman, 1982; Det-
mer et al., 1978;Eddy,1982; Oskamp, 1982), it was thought that hindsight 
bias might be minimized,if not reduced, by expertise or intense involve-
ment with a topic. For instance Arkes et al.(1981) predicted that sub-
jects making predictions from a more established knowledge base would 
be less susceptible to hindsight bias than those asked to make pre-
dictions from positions of relative ignorance. However, studies that 
used experimental materials derived from subjects' particular experience 
or expertise do not reveal any expert immunity. Researchers have 
uncovered hindsight bias with surgeons evaluating an episode involving a 
possible leaking abdominal aortic aneurism (Detmer, Fryback, & Gassner, 
1978), with physicians judging clinical assessments of a bartender with 
acute knee pain (Arkes et al., 1981), and with nurses evaluating out-
comes related to subordinants' work peformance (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981). 
The possibility was also rasied that cognitive limitations of 
foresight were confounding the hindsight- foresight differential. As 
explained by Slavic and Fischhoff (1977), it may be that the hindsight 
bias reflects foresight subjects' inability to see how things will look 
in the future as well as hindsight subjects' inability to recapture the 
uncertainties of the past. However, experiments designed to improve the 
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performance of the foresight subjects failed to reduce the difference 
between foresight and hindsight subjects (Slavic & Fischhoff, 1977). 
Given the robustness of the hindsight effect, Fischhoff (1977) 
proposed that our vulnerability to hindsight bias results from an 
automatic assimilation of new and old information. That is, he argued 
that we tend to make sense of outcome information by immediately inte-
grating it into what we already know about the given subject. Having 
made this reinterpretation, the reported outcome now seems an inevitable 
outgrowth of the reinterpreted situation. Even when trying to recon-
struct our foresightful state of mind, we remain "anchored" in our hind-
sightful perspective, resulting in the reported outcome appearing more 
probable than before. Further, we may be so anchored in our present 
perspective that the previous cognitive state is beyond retrieval. Once 
we know what has happened and have adjusted our perceptions accordingly, 
we may find it difficult at best to imagine how things could have turned 
out otherwise. 
This interpretation is consistent with research on cognitive pro-
cesses in memory that found that our memory of the past was not a memory 
of the uncertainties of the past. Rather, it appeared as a reconstruc-
tion of past events in terms of what occurred or what we are told or 
remember to have occurred. Evidence for the reconstructive processes of 
memory were reported in prose recall (Pichert & Anderson, 1977; Anderson 
& Pichert, 1978; Spiro, 1980), as well as in the context of eyewitness 
testimony (Loftus, 1975,1979,1980; Loftus & Loftus, 1980). 
Extending his original proposition, Fischhoff (1977) suggested 
that hindsight bias might represent a specific instance of a more gen-
13 
eral inability to disregard information that has already been processed. 
This more genera 1 phenomenon has been documented with a variety of 
information, including inadmissible evidence in court (Sue, Smith, & 
Caldwell, 1973), tests of general knowledge (Fischhoff, 1977), experi-
mental debriefing instructions (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), person 
descriptions (Wyer & Unverzagt, 1985), and scenarios of aggression fol-
lowed by information of mitigating circumstances (Zillman & Cantor, 
1976). Yet, this latter proposition has not been supported by other 
research on judgment and memory. For example, Ross et al. (1975) 
reported that "process debriefing" was generally successful in correct-
ing biased predictions. Their manipulation provided explicit discussion 
of the perseverance dynamic, which is defined as the tendency to retain 
beliefs even after the original supporting evidence was discredited. In 
a study of memory, Hasher and Griffin (1978) found that subjects' recall 
also depended on certain experimental factors. Depending on the demands 
made on the subjects when retention was tested, subjects were able to 
disregard prior information. 
More insight into the cognitive dynamics of hindsight bias was 
gained when researchers at last discovered a way to reduce the pre-
dictive distortions associated with outcome information. Specifically. 
the one strategy that has been effective at reducing hindsight bias 
required subjects to provide rationales for alternative outcomes. Sla-
vic and Fischhoff (1977) proposed that outcome information may eliminate 
the need to consider alternative scenarios. In this sense, it functions 
as a heuristic or simplication strategy. Thus, if subjects are asked to 
consider the possibility of other outcomes, they may become less 
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"anchored" in the hindsightful perspective. When asked to play devil's 
advocate, that is to argue for the occurrence of outcomes that did not 
occur, the perceived inevitability of the reported outcome was in fact 
diminished (horiat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980;Slovic & Fischhoff, 
1977). 
Playing devil's advocate, or the consider-the-opposite strategy 
(Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984), has proven successful in other attempts 
to overcome judgmental bias. For instance, the phenomenon of belief 
perseverance, defined as the tendency to retain beliefs even after the 
original supporting evidence has been invalidated (Ross et al., 1975), 
has been tempered by requiring subjects to provide causal explanations 
for alternative positions (Anderson, 1982; Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 
1980;Ross, et al., 1975). Lord, Lepper and Preston (1984) applied the 
strategy successfully to the biased assimilation of new evidence, 
defined as the tendency to interpret evidence in a way that supports 
initial beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), and to a related phenom-
enon, biased hypothesis-testing (Snyder & Swann, 1978). As with hind-
sight bias, the consider-the-opposite strategy was effective at " cor-
recting" judgment in both these domains whereas explicit instructions to 
be fair and unbiased failed. 
The success of the explanation task at reducing the bias suggests 
that it is not the outcome information per se that produces changes in 
likelihood estimates. Rather, it is the explanatory framework that sub-
jects develop in hindsight that produces a sense of outcome inevitabil-
ity (Ross et al., 1975; Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977). Even 
after an outcome or belief has been discredited, subjects may retain a 
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salient cognitive schema that still supports the initial conclusion. 
Only i•hen subjects are specifically asked to generate alternative 
rationales do they relinquish their cognitive attachment to the original 
pespective. Support for this view can be found in a series of experi-
ments specifically designed to relate the influence of causal schemas to 
probabilistic predictions. Ross, Lepper, Strack, and Steinmetz (1977) 
found that providing an explanation for a clinical outcome increased its 
perceived likelihood. This was true even when subjects were told that 
the outcomes were hypothetical. Ross et al. concluded: "Having gener-
ated a plausible account for suggesting how a particular event might 
have been predicted from knowledge of a patient's prior history, sub-
jects appeared consistently willing to make the inferential leap from 
possibility to probability" (p. 826). 
Thus, the process of explaining an outcome's occurrence may repre-
sent the critical cognitive activity that produces biased predictive 
judgment. Other researchers have acknowedged the relationship between 
hindsight and causal schemas. For example, Hogarth (1980) noted that 
hindsight invites us to impose a causal structure on a sequence of 
events. ~ith the outcome as a starting point, one can believe any cau-
sal sequence that seems plausible. In contrast, Hogarth noted that 
foresight requires "considerable powers of imagination and both the 
ability and willingness to entertain several hypotheses simultaneously" 
(p .102). Thus, hindsight bias might be the unfortunate result of 
"thinking backward" (Fischhoff, 1975b). 
A possible link between hindsight and the tendency to "think 
backward" was suggested by the results of a famous experiment designed 
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to examine the clinical insights of mental health workers. David Rosen-
han (1973) and colleagues each gained admission to a mental hospital 
by complaining of audible hallucinations. Once admitted, the researhers 
told the staff only the truth about their life histories and emotional 
states. However, each was diagnosed as schizophrenic and later dis-
charged with the diagnosis "schizophrenia in remission." Rosenhan 
reported one example of how information was distorted by a staff member 
in order to achieve consistency with the diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Specifically, one of the study confederates had revealed that he: 
had a close relationship with his mother but was rather remote from 
his father during his early childhood. During adolescence and 
beyond, however, his father became a close friend, while his rela-
tionship with his mother cooled. His present relationship with his 
wife was characteristically close and warm. Apart from occasional 
angry exchanges, friction was minimal. The children had rarely been 
spanked. (p.253) 
The clinical interpretation that was formally documented read: 
This white 39-year-old male ... manifests a long history of considera-
ble ambivalence in close relationships, which begins in early child-
hood. A warm relationship with his mother cools during adolescence. 
A distant relationship to his father is described as becoming very 
intense. Affective stability is absent. His attempts to control 
emotionality with his wife and children are punctuated by angry out-
bursts and, in the case of the children, spankings. And while he 
says that he has several good friends, one senses considerable ambi-
valence embedded in those relationships also. (p.253) 
People's attraction to explanations or causal schemas has been 
extensively documented from several perspectives. For instance, its 
existence is well documented in judgment and memory tasks (Ajzen, 1977; 
Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Fiedler, 1982; Fiske & Linville, 1980; 
Hastie, 1981; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 
1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981;Wyer & Gordon, 1982). The relationship 
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between causal reasoning and predictive judgment has also been the sub-
ject of much of the attribution research (Ross, 1977 ;Ross & Ander-
son, 1982; Ross & Fletcher, 1985). In a review of the research on causal 
reasoning, Tversky and Kahneman (1982c) noted that earlier research has 
provided a "compelling demonstration of the irresistible tendency to 
perceive sequences of events in terms of causal relations, even when the 
perceiver is fully aware that the relationship between events is inci-
dental and that the imputed causality is illusory" (p. 117). Further, 
they concluded that it is now ''a psychological commonplace that people 
strive to achieve a coherent interpretation of the events that surround 
them, and that the organization of events by schemas of cause-effect 
relations serves to achieve this goal" (p. 117). Other research on judg-
ment under uncertainty has further illustrated our cognitive drive for 
order even to the extent that people have been found to seek order and 
meaning in random events such as flipping a fair coin (Lindman & 
Edwards, 1961). 
From an in-depth analysis of one possible manifestation of the 
drive for cognitive order, specifically, hindsight bias, we know that 
outcome information biases our predictive judgment, that we are largely 
unaware of being outcome-dependent, and that we are unable to transcend 
the bias except when specifically requested to generate rationales for 
alternative outcomes. However, we know very little about some of the 
practical implications associated with hindsight bias. A critical 
real-world implication of hindsight bias pertains to hindsightful evalu-
ations, a phenomenon more commonly called second-guessing. Given what 
research has already uncovered, there is good reason to suspect the use 
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of hindsight as a valid or cognitively uncontaminated gauge of fore-
sight. 
Implications for Second-Guessing 
In his early studies of hindsight bias, Fischhoff (1975a,1975b) 
acknowledged the implications that hindsight bias held for the objectiv-
ity of second-guessing. 
Misfortunes bring out the Monday-morning quarterback in us all. 
When things go badly, we tend to look for a culprit to blame; then, 
once we find one, we second-guess him, wondering how he could have 
been so foolish. Looking back, we feel imbued with that special 
wisdom born of hindsight. 
Historical examples abound, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs, 
Vietnam, Watergate - all of these once-future events seem now to be 
the inevitable result of stupid mistakes in judgment. Many of us 
feel that had we been in a position to influence matters, we would 
have made decisions more sagaciously than did those in power. But 
would we? (p.71) 
Because of our second-guessing tendencies, which may be particu-
larly aroused following an unfortunate event, Fischhoff (1975a) tested 
whether subjects, who were informed of the outcome to an event, could 
reconstruct the perceptions of people who did not have access to outcome 
information. In the experiment, both hindsight subjects, who were told 
that a particular outcome had occurred, and control subjects, who were 
given no outcome information,were instructed to "guess" the judgments of 
students of social science in other universities regarding the likeli-
hood of certain outcomes and the significance of certain antecedent 
events. Fischhoff found that the hindsight subjects attributed more 
clairvoyant predictions to students in other universities than did con-
trol subjects. Further, hindsight subjects were more likely than control 
subjects to expect other students to recognize the significance of cer-
19 
tain antecedent events that only the benefit of hindsight allowed them 
to see. 
Thus, there is some evidence that the difficulty we have in rec-
reating a foresightful perspective for ourselves is paralleled by what 
Fischhoff (1975a) called " a failure to empathize with outcome-ignorant 
others" (p. 295). However, there are three important questions to 
address before the connection between outcome information and biased 
second-guessing can be confidently drawn. First, the fairness of sec-
ond-guessing is predicated on the notion that we can see how a situation 
appeared to others, that is, before the outcome was known. In order to 
generalize hindsight bias to the second-guessing process, we need to 
directly test whether hindsight subjects presume predictive superior-
ity to that of a decision-maker who, like many decision-makers in real 
life, was not appraised in advance of the outcome to an uncertain situ-
ation. 
A second critical question remains regarding the relationship 
between hindsight bias and judgments of others' decision. Specifically, 
does hindsight bias systematically distort evaluative judgment as it has 
been found to distort predictive judgment? That is, do we believe that 
we would have foreseen the likelihood of an unfortunate event (pre-
diction), and consequently, felt that the original decision-maker should 
have foreseen what was only apparent to us in hindsight (evaluation)? 
Prior research has shown that attributions of responsibility are associ-
ated with the belief that the consequences of certain decisions were 
foreseeable (Chaiken & Darley, 1973; Finchum & Jaspers, 1980; Heider, 
1958; Shaw & Shulzer, 1964; Walster, 1966). Thus, it is important to 
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investigate whether access to outcome information undermines the objec-
tivity of hindsightful evaluations of others' decisions. 
Finally, as Fischhoff (1975b) described, our second-guessing ten-
dencies seem most exaggerated when a misfortunate event occurs. Prior 
research has demonstrated that the more serious the outcome of an event, 
the more responsibility is attributed to the perpetrator (Arkkelin, Oak-
ley, & Mynatt, 1979; Chaiken & Darley, 1973; Walster, 1966). Although 
this finding has not always been replicated (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981; Wal-
ster, 1967), the gravity of the judgmental error represents a important 
contextual factor associated with second-guessing others. It is impor-
tant to determine whether or not the context of second-guessing exagger-
ates any predictive or evaluative distortions found with outcome infor-
mation alone. 
An Experimental Investigation of Second-Guessing 
Because the connection between hindsight bias and the objectivity 
of second-guessing others has crucial implications for understanding how 
we can fairly evaluate and learn from the decisions of others, the pres-
ent study was designed to explore the answers to three questions. 
First, this study was designed to test whether the predictive distor-
tions already associated with outcome information generalize to a con-
text that includes another person's judgment. Unlike prior studies of 
hindsight, subjects in the present study were informed of an expert's 
assessment of a case that they were also asked to assess. Specifically, 
subjects read clinical case histories that included an expert recommen-
dation along with the patient information. The outcome information 
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included at the end of the case history was designed to either support 
or not support the expert assessment. Based on prior evidence of peo-
ple's distorted impressions of their predictive prowess, it was first 
hypothesized that subjects who received outcome information that contra-
dicted an expert opinion would overestimate what they would have fore-
seen without the benefit of hindsight. Specifically, it was expected 
that these subjects would report significantly le~s predictive agree-
ment with the expert than subjects who received either favorable or no 
outcome information. 
The second major question this study regarded whether or not out-
come information systematically biases the evaluations of another's 
judgment as it has been found to bias subjective predictive judgment. 
Based on prior evidence of people's inability to reconstruct the fore-
sight of others (Fischhoff, 1975a), it was hypothesized that subjects 
who read of an outcome that contradicted the expert judgment would eval-
uate the expert judgment more harshly than subjects who received either 
favorable or no outcome information. 
The third major question of the present study regareded whether or 
not a particular contextual factor, specifically the consequences fac-
ing someone as a result of a misfortunate or unfavorable outcome, would 
strengthen the bias. It was expected that the subjects in this study 
who received information pertaining to a pending malpractice suit filed 
against the expert would exhibit significantly less predictive agreement 
with the expert and assign significantly less favorable evaluation rat-
ings to the expert judgment than would subjects who read only of an 
unfavorable outcome. 
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Results from this study have both theoretical and practical impor-
tance. In order to broaden our understanding of how hindsight bias 
operates, we need to know more about when and where it occurs. Results 
from this study show whether hindsight bias generalizes to situations 
involving another decision-maker and whether the bias has a predictable 
influence on the hindsightful evaluations of that decision-maker. Fur-
ther, these results will show whether the context of hindsightful evalu-
ations, specifically the mention of a formal investigation of the deci-
sion-maker's judgment, exaggerates the predictive and evaluative 
distortions associated with outcome information. These findings have 
critical implications in many practical settings, most notably, those 
associated with our legal system of evaluating the judgments of others. 
Not only is the tendency to second-guess others at the heart of many of 
our ethical and moral judgments but our system of due process is largely 
based on the hindsight of some to judge the foresight of others. 
Before reviewing the findings from the present study, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that the manifestation of hindsight bias being 
investigated in this study may be more subtle than that investigated by 
prior hindsight research. When an individual's prediction does not 
eventuate, there may be human judgmental fault involved. However, the 
fact that the prediction did not bear true is not the appropriate 
indictment of the judgment. Rather, the appropriate criteria for an 
objective evaluation of an earlier decision include the review and use 
of only the information that was available at the time the decision was 
made. Although hindsight might contradict an earlier decision, the 
actual decision or judgment may have been emminently reasonable given 
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h t was known. ~--
The major purpose of this study was to investigate 
~hether second-guessers fall prey to hindsight bias, that is, evaluate a 
decision-maker on the basis of what became apparent only in hindsight. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects 
One hundred and sixty introductory psychology students from Loyola 
University of Chicago participated in this study in partial fulfillment 
of a course requirement. Forty subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
four experimental conditions. Although subjects completed the materials 
in small groups, discussion of the study or of the materials was disal-
lowed during the sessions. 
Experimental Materials 
The experimental materials used in this study included two authen-
tic psychotherapy case histories of approximately 3, 000 words, each 
taken from a clinical casebook by Goldstein and Palmer (1975). (See 
Appendix B.) Because the object of the present study concerned judgment 
rather than accuracy, clinical materials were chosen rather than pas-
sages from which there was a "right" answer. To maintain consistency 
with related research, two clinical cases were selected for use that 
were previously used in a related study of outcome information and 
social explanation (Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977). These 
particular cases were selected because of their extensive descriptions 
of the patient's background, formative experiences, and symptoms at the 
time professional help was sought. As summarized below by Ross et 
24 
25 
al. (1977), both cases provided an abundance of detailed and potentially 
relevant material that subjects could use to evaluate expert clinical 
judgment and the likelihood of subsequent events in the patient's life. 
In one case, a young housewife, Shirley K., arrived at the clinic 
complaining of frequent headaches and dizziness. She expressed 
great anxiety over her uncontrollable thoughts of harming her 
2-year-old son and repugnance for her current husband. Her history 
included an early and unhappy marriage to escape a manipulating 
mother and restrictive father, a subsequent liason with a musician 
who fathered her son and eventually committed suicide, and a cur-
rent, abhorrent marriage to a lawyer who was frequently unemployed 
and unable to provide adequate support for his family. The report 
further descibes Shirley's reactions to the suicide of her lover, 
the death of her father, and the commitment of her mother to a men-
tal institution. 
In the other case, George P., a middle-aged bachelor, was seen 
upon his readmission to a Veteran's Administration hospital suffer-
ing from stomach pains and a generalized weakness and malaise. His 
history included an early separation from his family, a period spent 
as a hobo, a subsequent term of military service, involvement in a 
number of unsuccessful business ventures, and his eventual return 
home to care for his mother until her death. The report also 
described George's previous hospital admissions and health problems, 
his potential difficulties with unadmitted alcoholism, and a recent 
dispute which led George to resign from his last job as a food 
machine servicman. ( p. 819) 
Two different clinical case histories were included to test 
whether any of the findings from this study might be restricted to a 
particular context. These two cases were chosen because they involved 
patients that differed on major dimensions such as gender,age, family 
background, and symptomotology. 
The section of each case history that summarized the patient's 
recovery was not included in the study materials. Instead, subjects 
received fictitious information about a clinical judgment and treatment 
recommendation rendered by a staff clinical psychologist,as well as some 
fictitious information about subsequent events in the patient's life. 
The feasibility of all the fictitious information was reviewed by two 
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members of the clinical faculty and two clinical graduate students from 
the Psychology Department at Loyola Univesity of Chicago. Subjects' 
reactions to the case histories in general, and to the case endings in 
particular, were explored during pilot testing. Excluding the ficti-
tious information included at the end, George's case history was pre-
sented to subjects exactly as it appeared in the casebook. However, due 
to subjects' reactions during pilot-testing, Shirley's case material was 
modified for use in this experiment. Specifically, a majority of the 
pilot subjects who read of Shirley's favorable response to treatment 
perceived the likelihood of her recovery to be very small given her vio-
lent fantasies toward her son. To provide a version that was more 
believable to this subject population, the favorable ending written for 
Shirley was used, but all mention of Shirley's violent thoughts towards 
her son was excluded from the case history. 
Design and Procedure 
Upon their arrival, subjects were handed a packet of materials . 
The first page of the packet was an introductory statement that briefed 
subjects on the study's purpose and the nature of the tasks. (See Appen-
dix A.) Subjects were told that the study involved clinical judg-
ment,with the purpose of revealing how people like themselves judged 
certain clinical situations,and that the study tasks included reading a 
case history "much as it appears in an authentic clinical case textbook" 
and answering certain questions. The specific wording of the questions 
varied according to which client, i.e., Shirley or George, that subjects 
were assigned to evaluate and which outcome information subjects had 
received. (See Appendix C for a complete listing of all questions.) 
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The experimental design is summarized in Table 1. Subjects were 
assigned according to a block randomized procedure to one of four out-
come conditions. Sex and case were also balanced. Thus, each block com-
prised 16 combinations of gender, case, and outcome condition. 
All subjects assigned to a case received the same statement of 
clinical judgment and treatment recommendation. In Shirley's case, sub-
jects read that the clinical psychologist assigned to the case, Dr. M., 
judged that Shirley's presenting physical symptoms, specifically her 
headaches and dizziness, were caused by emotional issues. Dr. M. recom-
mended that Shirley immediately begin weekly outpatient psychotherapy to 
work on her emotional issues. All subjects who were assigned to read 
George's case history read that Dr. M. judged George to be emotionally 
capable of leaving the hospital. Dr. M. also recommended that George 
see a vocational counselor to be placed immediately in a suitable job 
and that George begin weekly outpatient counseling to help him adjust to 
leaving the hospital and functioning in society. 
The four outcome conditions reflected variation in the outcome 
information included after the statement of clinical judgment and treat-
ment recommendation. 
Control Condition 
Subjects assigned to this condition did not receive any patient 
outcome information or mention of a malpractice suit. 
Table 1 
Study Design 
Condition Description Case ffl: 
Control No patient outcome information 10 
10 
Favorable Favorable patient outcome 10 
information 10 
Unfavorable Unfavorable patient outcome 10 
information 10 
Malpractice Unfavorable patient outcome and 10 
mention of a malpractice suit 10 
TOTAL 80 
Shirley Case 112: 
Men 10 
Women 10 
Men 10 
Women 10 
Men 10 
Women 10 
Men 10 
Women 10 
80 
George 
Men 
Women 
Men 
Women 
Men 
Women 
Men 
Women 
TOTAL 
40 
40 
40 
40 
160 
N 
00 
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Favorable Condition 
Subjects in this condition received information of a favorable 
patient outcome. The outcomes assigned to subjects in this condition 
closely resembled the actual outcomes reported in the casebook. The 20 
subjects who were assigned to read Shirley's case history read that 
Shirley followed the treatment recommendation and that her physical 
symptoms did in fact disappear as she progressed in weekly outpatient 
psychotherapy. Subjects who read George's case history were informed 
that the hospital discharge, placement in a new job and weekly counsel-
ing sessions helped greatly to build George's confidence and sense of 
well-being. They read that George's physical symptoms subsided as he 
became increasingly secure about functioning in society. 
Unfavorable Condition 
Subjects in this condition received fictitious outcome information 
about the patient's unfavorable response to treatment. The 20 subjects 
assigned to Shirley's case read that her physical symptoms worsened even 
before beginning psychotherapy,and that after seeing a neurologist, 
Shirley discovered that her headaches and dizziness were caused by a 
growing cerebral tumor. The case ending also stated that Shirley suf-
fered irreversible brain damage that may have been avoided had she 
received medical attention right away. The case ending designed for 
Shirley was intended to illustrate an expert error in clinical judgment 
based on the fact that Dr. M. 's prediction of the emotional basis of 
Shirley's physical symptoms was not supported by subsequent events. The 
case ending was also intended to illustrate an expert protocol error 
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based on the fact that Dr. M. did not investigate possible physical 
causes for the headaches and dizziness as a routine precautionary meas-
ure. As a point of contrast, the unfavorable case ending designed for 
George was intended to reflect a judgmental miscalculation of the 
extent of patient psychopathology. Specifically, the 20 subjects 
assigned to read about George were told that he was immediately over-
whelmed with anxiety upon leaving the hospital and was unable to see a 
vocational counselor or to attend his counseling sessions. Subjects 
were told that George was subsequently re-admitted to the hospital after 
a suicide attempt that left him with irreversible physical problems. 
Malpractice Condition 
Subjects in this condition received the same patient outcome 
information as subjects in the unfavorable condition along with a state-
ment about a $500,000 malpractice suit filed against Dr. M. In Shir-
ley's case, Dr. M. was being sued for not referring Shirley immediately 
to a physician to check on her physical symptoms. In George's case, Dr. 
M. faced malpractice charges for not referring the patient immediately 
to an inpatient psychiatric unit for more observation and help. 
Manipulation Check 
Because the study hypotheses pertained to the influence of outcome 
information on predictive and evaluative judgment, a manipulation check 
was administered to verify that subjects had attended to and retained 
the particular outcome information included at the end of their case 
history. After subjects had completed and returned all study materials, 
they were asked to check which of a series of outcomes they had read. 
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To be included in the study, it was necessary for all subjects in the 
favorable condition to indicate that "the patient had improved", for all 
subjects assigned to Shirley's case in either the unfavorable or malp-
ractice condition to indicate that "the patient was diagnosed by a phy-
sician as having a tumor'', for all subjects assigned to George's case in 
either the unfavorable or malpractice condition to indicate that "the 
patient had attempted suicide", for all control subjects to indicate 
that "there was no information about any of the above outcomes happen-
. " 1ng. 
As a result of the manipulation check, 12 subjects, 8 men and 4 
women, were excluded from the study. The unfavorable condition involv-
ing Shirley's case history emerged as more problematic in terms of sub-
jects' attention to outcome; 10 of the 12 excluded subjects had been 
assigned to read this version of the patient outcome. Eight of these 
10 subjects indicated on the manipulation check that no outcome informa-
tion was available. It is interesting to note that, even though sub-
jects in the malpractice condition also received the same outcome infor-
mation, none of these subjects failed the manipulation check. It may 
be that the mention of the malpractice suit heightened the salience of 
the outcome information. 
Dependent Measures 
Predictive Judgment 
Subjects were required to make a series of predictions regarding 
the likelihood of various patient-related outcomes. All likelihood 
questions were presented as foresightful predictions. That is, before 
making the first prediction, all subjects were instructed as follows: 
32 
Assume that you are a clinical psychologist and Shirley (George) 
went to see you instead of Dr. M. Assume that you just completed 
the interview with Shirley (George) wherein information about her 
(his) background, formative experiences, and current complaints was 
discussed ... Remember that you just met with Shirley (George). 
Similar instructions were repeated before all subsequent likelihood 
questions. 
Subjects were asked to predict events that pertained to: (a) the 
validity of a clinical assessment; (b) the appropriateness of a treat-
ment recommendation; and (c) the likelihood of a specific patient 
response to the treatment. First, subjects rated the chances that Dr. 
M. 's clinical assessment of the patient would bear true. Those assigned 
to Shirley's case were asked to predict the chances that Shirley's symp-
toms "are" or "are not" caused by emotional issues. (These items were 
worded to represent foresightful predictions and subjects evaluated the 
two mutually exclusive event possibilities). Those assigned to George's 
case were asked to predict the chances that George " . " l.S or "is not" 
emotionally capable of leaving the hospital. 
Next, subjects were asked to predict whether Dr. M. 's treatment 
recommendation would prove to be appropriate for the patient. In Shir-
ley's case, subjects were asked to predict the chances that weekly out-
patient psychotherapy "is" or "is not" appropriate treatment for Shir-
ley. Subjects assigned to read George's case history predicted the 
chances that a hospital discharge, a suitable job, and weekly counseling 
"is" or "is not" appropriate treatment for George. Although the ques-
tions for both Shirley and George subjects addressed Dr. M. 's treatment 
recommendation, the content of the questions was differentially complex 
for Shirley and George subjects. In particular, the treatment recommen-
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dation for George involved three parts (hospital discharge, a suitable 
job, and weekly counseling) as opposed to the one treatment element 
recommended for Shirley (weekly outpatient therapy). 
The final likelihood question required that subjects across the 
four outcome conditions predict the chances that two mutually exclusive 
patient outcomes would occur. One outcome summarized the patient 
responding favorably to the recommended treatment; the other outcome 
described the patient responding unfavorably to the recommended treat-
ment. For Shirley, the two outcomes were summarized as follows: 
Shirley will learn in therapy to talk more openly about her feelings 
about past and current relationships. As she progresses in therapy, 
her physical symptoms will disappear and her relationships with her 
husband and son will improve. 
Before beginning therapy, Shirley's physical symptoms will worsen. 
Shirley will see a physician and discover that her physical symptoms 
are caused by a physical condition. 
For George, the favorable and unfavorable outcomes were summarized as 
follows: 
The new job and the weekly counseling sessions will help greatly to 
build George's confidence and sense of well-being. George will 
become increasingly secure about functioning in society and his 
physical symptoms will subside. 
Immediately after being discharged from the hospital, George will 
become overwhelmed with anxiety. George will be unable to leave his 
apartment and will attempt suicide. 
All likelihood questions were formatted comparably to those in 
prior investigations of hindsight bias. That is, subjects were asked to 
assign "forced-sum" probability estimates (estimates that sum to 100~~) 
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to mutually exclusive events. Although hindsight bias has been shown to 
withstand diverse question formats (Fischhoff, 1982b), the difference 
between forced-sum a~d open-ended probability estimates has not been 
analyzed. Therefore, to explore whether open-ended estimates would 
yield different results, subjects were asked to generate both forced-sum 
and open-ended predictions for questions pertaining to the likelihood of 
a specific patient reponse. Procedurally, the open-ended estimates were 
required before the forced-sum estimates. Subjects were requested to 
first assign a single probability to the favorable patient outcome with-
out any mention of an alternative ending or of forced-summing. Next 
subjects were asked to assign another open-ended probability to the 
unfavorable patient outcome. Finally, subjects were presented with both 
patient outcomes and asked to assign forced-sum estimates. 
For the open-ended estimates, all subjects were presented with a 
visual display of percentages that ascended from 0% to 100% in incre-
ments of 10. Two values were labeled: O~~ was labeled as "No Chance Of 
Occurring" ; 100~~ was labeled as "Certain of Occurring." Subjects were 
asked to circle one of the 11 percentages that best represented the 
chances that the favorable outcome would occur, Given some known diffi-
culties with unanchored probability estimates (Hogarth, 1981), a visual 
display with only 11 values was included to help structure an open-
ended probability question. Although this modificatitm may have facili-
tated the subjects' task, this meant that the range of appropriate 
responses for the open-ended probability estimates was not identical to 
the range accepted for the forced-sum estimate. 
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All likelihood questions were based on two mutually exclusive 
alternatives. For instance, the first likelihood measure represented 
the perceived chances of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M. 
The alternative measure represented the perceived chances of not making 
the same clinical assessment. It should be noted that the study hypoth-
eses were framed to reflect the power of outcome information to decrease 
the perceived likelihood of events and to decrease the perceived favora-
bleness of another's judgment. Thus, the dependent measures selected 
for discussion pertain only to estimates of agreement with Dr. M. For 
instance, the first likelihood measure represented the perceived chances 
of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M. Similarly, the other 
prediction measures presented here correspond to the perceived likeli-
hood of recommending the same treatment plan as Dr. M. and the perceived 
likelihood of a favorable patient outcome that Dr. M. predicted based on 
the clinical assessment and treatment plan. 
As discussed by Winer (1971), proportion data involve predictable 
departures from normality. To correct for this artifact, an arcs in 
transformation was calculated for each of the probability measures 
(Winer, 1971). Although the transformed measures provide a "cleaner" 
picture of the data, the units of measurement from the transformed meas-
ures are less familiar than percentage units. Thus, for presentation 
purposes, the untransformed responses, specifically, subjects percentage 
predictions, are reported. 
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Evaluative Judgment 
A major goal of this study was to investigate evidence of the 
hindsight effect in evaluative judgment. A global index was calculated 
for each subject to represent a general evaluation rating of Dr. M. 
This index was the average response to four different rating questions. 
The index for one subject, who failed to respond to the final index 
item, was based on the average response to three and not four items. 
Cronbach's Alpha test for internal consistency revealed high inter-item 
reliability (Alpha= .87). 
Three of the rating questions included in the index involved eval-
uating Dr. M. 's judgment on a six point Likert scale that ranged from 
labeled values 1,2,and 3,signifying very poor, poor, or slightly poor 
judgment,respectively, through values 4,5,and 6, signifying slightly 
good, good, and very good judgment. Subjects were asked to use this 
scale to rate: "the quality of Dr. M. 's overall clinical judgment;" Dr. 
M. 's judgment either that "Shirley's symptoms were caused by emotional 
issues" or that "George was emotionally capable of leaving the hospi-
tal;" and Dr. M. 's treatment recommendation that either "Shirley begin 
weekly outpatient psychotherapy to work on her emotional issues" or that 
"George be discharged from the hospital, that he see a vocational coun-
selor to be placed in a suitable job, and that he begin weekly outpa-
tient counseling to help with the adjustment." 
The final evaluation question used in the index required subjects 
to use a six point Likert scale to indicate their level of agreement 
with the statement: "Dr. M. made an appropriate recommendation." The 
• "d ' 1 II II II six values were anchored from 1sagree strong y to agree strongly. 
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Along with the index items, other evaluative questions were 
included on the questionnaire to explore the relationship between out-
come information and other types of evaluative perceptions. For 
instance, subjects were asked to use the same six point Likert agreement 
scale described above to indicate their level of agreement with state-
ments that summarized some common points of dispute between foresight-
ful and hindsightful decision-makers. The statements, tailored to this 
context,included: 
1. Shirley (George) represented a difficult case for any clinical 
psychologist. 
2. There was not enough information about Shirley (George) for 
Dr. M. to make an appropriate recommendation. 
3. Dr. M. should have discussed the case with other profession-
als. 
4. No matter what, (1) Shirley's physical symptoms should have 
been checked out by a physician; or (2) George should have 
been kept in the hospital for more emotional help. 
Another major issue associated with hindsightful evaluations is 
the issue of blame. Attributions of blame have been associated with the 
belief that the consequences of certain decisions and actions were fore-
seeable (Chaiken & Darley, 1973; Fincham & Jaspers, 1980; Heider, 1958; 
Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; Walster, 1966). To begin investigating the rela-
tionship between outcome information and attributions of blame, subjects 
were asked to distribute forced-sum proportions of blame for the unfavo-
rable patient outcome to Dr. M. and to the patient. 
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A final evaluation question involved ranking Dr. M. 's treatment 
recommendation from "least preferred" to "most preferred" from among 
four other treatment alternatives. For both cases, one alternative 
referred to arranging for more information from the patient before mak-
ing a definitive recommendation and another alternative referred to 
meeting with other professionals to discuss the case before making a 
definitive recommendation. These options were included to assess two of 
the more common hindsightful observations, namely, that more information 
or more collaboration was needed. 
The other two alternatives that subjects were asked to rank were 
designed to represent treatment plans that, when compared to Dr. M. 's 
recommendation, represented either a slightly more cautious approach or 
a much more cautious approach. More conservative alternatives were 
included because of the informally observed tendency for hindsightful 
evaluators to say: "You should have been more careful." In Shirley's 
case, the slightly more cautious recommendation advised Shirley to begin 
weekly psychotherapy and see a physician if her physical problems con-
tinue. (In Dr. M.'s treatment plan, there was no mention of a possible 
need for medical intervention.) The even more cautious approach 
involved advising Shirley to see a physician right away. In George's 
case, the slightly more cautious approach involved a hospital discharge 
and placement in a halfway house for men as a transition to living and 
working on his own. The even more conservative plan involved referring 
Geroge immediately to the psychiatric unit of the hospital. 
The results of analyses using all of the above dependent measures 
are summarized in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Hindsight Bias and Predictive Judgment 
Overview 
The dependent measures selected to test the influence of outcome 
information on predictive judgment were subjects' forced-sum estimates 
of: (a) the chances of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M.; 
(b) the chances of recommending the same treatment plan as Dr. M.; (c) 
the chances of a favorable patient response given the clinical assess-
ment and treatment plan recommended by Dr. M. Before testing the 
influence of specific outcome information on each dependent measure, 
univariate analyses of variance were conducted to confirm the presence 
of an overall effect of outcome information across the four outcome con-
ditions. Once the overall effect was found, analytical comparisons were 
conducted to test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis stated that 
unfavorable outcome information would diminish the probabilities 
assigned to each dependent prediction measure. Specifically, the expec-
tation was that subjects in the unfavorable condition would assign sig-
nificantly lower probabilities to each of the three prediction measures 
than subjects in either the favorable or control condition. The second 
hypothesis stated that information regarding a malpractice suit filed 
against the expert Dr. M. would exaggerate the effect of outcome infor-
mation suggested by the first hypothesis. Specifically, the expectation 
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was that subjects in the malpractice condition would assign signifi-
cantly lower probabilities to the three dependent prediction measures 
than subjects in the unfavorable condition. For these and all subse-
quent analyses, the .05 level of statistical significance was applied. 
Before pursuing the univariate analyses of variance, correlations 
among the three forced-sum estimates were examined. Moderate correla-
tions were found among all three likelihood estimates. The correlation 
between estimates pertaining to the clinical assessment and treatment 
recommendation was .63. The correlation between estimates of the clini-
cal assessment and favorable patient outcome was .53. Finally, the cor-
relation between estimates of the treatment plan and favorable patient 
outcome was .55. Because none of these correlations were so high as to 
suggest that the three estimates reflected a single prediction, univar-
iate analyses of variance and analytical comparisons were conducted to 
test the study hypotheses for each of the three prediction measures: the 
clinical assessment, the treatment plan, and the outcome scenario. 
The Clinical Assessment 
Concerning the first prediction, the perceived chances of making 
the same clinical assessment as Dr. M, Table 2 shows that significant 
mean differences were found as a function of outcome condition, E 
(3,155)=11.25. As can be seen in Table 2, there was little difference 
in the average probability estimates between subjects in the unfavorable 
and the malpractice conditions. There was also a minimal difference 
in the average probability estimates between subjects in the favorable 
and control conditions. However, subjects who received unfavorable 
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patient outcome information, in either the unfavorable or malpractice 
conditions, were different in their predictions than subjects in the 
favorable and control conditions. Table 2 shows that receiving unfavo-
rable outcome information diminished subjects' perceptions of the 
chances of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M. 
Along with an overall group effect, there was an overall effect 
for case. Subjects assigned to read Shirley's case history gave higher 
probability estimates for this item than subjects assigned to read about 
George (72.0~~ versus 54.0~~. respectively), £: (1,143)=30.57. Closer 
examination of the cell means revealed that the case differential was 
most pronounced for subjects who received unfavorable patient outcome 
information in either the unfavorable or malpractice conditions. Shir-
ley subjects in the unfavorable condition assigned considerably higher 
probabilities to the chances of making the same clinical assessment as 
Dr. M. than George subjects in the unfavorable condition (64.6% versus 
37.0%, respectively). Further, Shirley subjects in the malpractice con-
dition assigned higher estimates to this item than George subjects in 
the malpractice condition (67. O'Jo versus 43. 4~~. respectively). Thus, 
Shirley's unfavorable ending generated higher estimates of this pre-
diction than did the unfavorable patient ending added to George's case 
history. 
Table 2 
Subject Predictions as a Function of Outcome Condition 
Subject Predictions Control Favorable Unfavorable Malpractice N* F df 
1. Chances of subject making 
the same clinical assess-
ment as the expert, Dr. M. 
Mean 72.1% 74.5% 50.8% 55.2% 159 11. 25 (3,155) <.05 
SD 19.6 14.7 26.6 26.0 
2. Chances of subject 
recommending the same 
treatment plan as the 
expert, Dr. M. 
Mean 73.8% 75.1% 48.2% 63.6% 160 14.67 (3,156) <.05 
SD 15.9 16.9 24.6 23.3 
3. Chances of a favorable 
patient outcome given the 
clinical assessment and 
treatment plan of the 
expert, Dr. M. 
Mean 74.7% 79.8% 50.0% 55.0% 160 23.60 (3,156) <.05 
SD 13.6 12.6 21.8 25.l 
*One subject failed to respond to the first prediction item. 
**Statistically significant, Cochrans C = .43, E. <.05 ~ 
N 
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Table 2 also presents the standard deviations associated with each 
outcome condition. Although statistically nonsignificant, Cochrans C 
=.36, E <.l, there was a trend for subjects in both the unfavorable and 
malpractice conditions to be more variable in their responses than sub-
jects in the favorable and control conditions. Specifically,a comparison 
of the average standard deviations reveals that subjects in the favora-
ble and malpractice conditions were approximately 75~ more variable in 
their responses than subjects in the favorable condition and approxi-
mately 33~ more variable in their responses than subjects in the control 
condition. Thus, as compared to the favorable patient outcome, the 
unfavorable patient outcome tended to produce an extended range of sub-
ject responses as well to have significantly diminished values of the 
subject predictions. 
Having found significant mean differences across all outcome con-
ditions, a series of analytical comparisons were conducted to test the 
specific hypotheses. The first hypothesis, specifically, that unfavora-
ble patient outcome information would decrease predictive agreement with 
the expert, was confirmed with this dependent measure. Subjects in in 
the unfavorable condition considered it more unlikely that they would 
make the same clinical assessment as Dr M. than did subjects in the 
favorable condition, £ (1,155)=21.90. Further, subjects in the unfavo-
rable condition perceived making the same clinical assessment as more 
unlikely than the control subjects, who had received no patient outcome 
information, £ (1,155)=18.15. There was no significant difference 
between control subjects and those who received favorable outcome infor-
mation on this item. The case factor did not influence the overall sig-
nificance or the overall pattern of the above results. 
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A further major study hypothesis stated that hindsight bias would 
be exaggerated as a function of information regarding a malpractice 
suit. Specifically, the expectation was that subjects in the malprac-
tice condition would report significantly less predictive agreement 
with the expert than subjects in the unfavorable condition. This 
hypothesis was not supported by these prediction data. As can be seen 
in Table 2, subjects in the malpractice condition did not consider the 
chances of making the same clinical assessment as Dr. M. to be smaller 
than subjects in the unfavorable condition. These results were also 
unaffected by the case factor. 
The Treatment Recommendation 
The second dependent prediction measure pertained to the perceived 
chances of recommending the same treatment plan as Dr. M. As seen in 
Table 2,significant mean differences were found as a function of out-
come condition for this measure, £ (3,156)=14.67. Overall, subjects in 
the unfavorable and malpractice conditions gave less comparable respon-
ses than they did on the first measure (48.2% and 63.6%,respectively). 
However, subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions assigned 
lower probabilities to the chances of recommending Dr. M. 's treatment 
plan than subjects in either the favorable or control conditions. A 
similar trend with respect to within group variability is also shown in 
Table 2. Although statistically nonsignificant, Cochrans ~ =.36, E <.1, 
there was a trend for subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice condi-
tions to to be more variable in their responses to this measure than 
subjects in the control and favorable conditions. Thus, as with the 
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first prediction item, unfavorable patient outcome information appeared 
to have extended the range of subject responses as well as to signifi-
cantly diminish the value of subject responses for this item. 
Along with an overall group effect, there was a significant case 
effect found with the second prediction measure, £ (1,144)=8.10. As 
with the first prediction measure, Shirley subjects assigned higher 
probabilities to this item than George subjects (69.9% versus 60.75%, 
respectively). Closer examination of the cell means revealed that the 
mean difference in predictions was largest between subjects in the unfa-
vorable and malpractice conditions. Specifically, Shirley subjects in 
the unfavorable condition assigned higher probabilities to the chances 
of making the same treatment recommendation as Dr. M. than George sub-
jects in the unfavorable condition (56.8% versus 39.8%, respectively). 
Similarly, Shirley subjects in the malpractice condition assigned higher 
probabilities to this item than George subjects in the malpractice con-
dition (73.5~ versus 53.8%, respectively). As with the first prediction 
item, Shirley's unfavorable ending generated more agreement with Dr. M. 
than George's unfavorable ending. 
Having found overall mean differences, analytical comparisons were 
conducted that confirmed the first study hypothesis with this prediction 
measure. Subjects who received unfavorable patient outcome information 
considered it more unlikely that they would recommend the same treatment 
plan as Dr. M. than subjects who either received favorable patient 
outcome information, £ (1,156)=34.30, or subjects who received no 
patient outcome information, £ (1,156)=31.18. As with the prior likeli-
hood measure, analytical comparisons did not reveal a significant dif-
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ference between control subjects and those who received favorable 
patient outcome information on this measure. As compared to favorable 
or no patient outcome information, unfavorable patient outcome informa-
tion diminished the perceived probability of making the same treatment 
recommendation as Dr. M. It is also interesting to note that, when com-
pared to no patient outcome information, favorable patient outcome 
information did not significantly increase the perceived probabilities 
associated \..·ith this item. The case factor exerted no influence on the 
overall significance or pattern of results found with these analytical 
comparisons. 
The hypothesis that malpractice information would exaggerate the 
hindsight effect was again not confirmed with this measure. There was a 
significant mean difference between subjects in the unfavorable and 
malpractice condition, £ (1,156)=11.23; however, the difference was in 
the opposite direction than hypothesized. As shown in Table 2, subjects 
in the malpractice condition considered it more likely that they would 
recommend the same treatment plan as Dr. M. than did subjects in the 
unfavorable condition (63.6% versus 48.2%, respectively). Despite this 
contrast with the unfavorable condition, subjects in the malpractice 
condition did report significantly less predictive agreement with Dr. 
M.'s treatment plan than did subjects in either the favorable condi-
tion, £ (1,156)=6.28, or in the control condition, £ (1,156)=4.94. 
There were no case effects associated with these latter findings. 
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The Outcome Scenario 
The third likelihood estimate pertained to the perceived probabil-
ity of a favorable patient outcome given Dr. M. 's clinical assessment 
and treatment plan. As summarized in Table 2, significant mean differ-
ences were found as a function of outcome condition, £ (3,156)=23.60. 
As with the clinical assessment prediction, there was little difference 
in mean response on this measure between subjects in the favorable or 
control conditions or between subjects in the unfavorable and malprac-
tice condition. However, there was an appreciable mean difference 
between the subjects in the favorable or control conditions and subjects 
in the unfavorable or malpractice conditions. As seen in Table 2, 
receiving unfavorable patient outcome information decreased the per-
ceived probability of a favorable patient outcome as compared to receiv-
ing favorable or no patient outcome information. 
Along with an overall mean differences as a function of outcome 
information, the variances associated with the group mean responses were 
significantly different,Cochrans f =.43. As seen in Table 2, the two 
groups of subjects who received unfavorable patient outcome information 
were more variable in their estimates than subjects who received favora-
ble or no patient outcome information. This pattern was significant 
both with the transformed and untransformed values suggesting that the 
finding is more than artifactual. (See Method for discussion of trans-
formed and untransformed measures.) Although statistically nonsignifi-
cant, the same trend of increased variability for unfavorable and malp-
ractice subjects was apparent with the other two prediction measures. 
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The issue of differential variability is less ~ statistical con-
cern than a point of substantive interest within the context of the 
hindsight phenomenon. It has been demonstrated that the analysis of 
variance is quite robust with respect to the assumption of homogeneity 
of variance (Harris, 1985; Hays, 1981; Tabachnick & Fidel, 1983; Winer, 
1971). Further, the standard tests for variance differences in the 
analysis of variance are notoriously sensitive tests (Hays, 1981; 
Tabachnick & Fidel, 1983; Winer, 1971). Therefore, the differential 
variability detected by the Cochran's test does not necessarily 
undermine the validity of the test for mean differences using the analy-
sis of variance. But the differential variances among outcome condi-
tions may represent a meaningful concomittant of hindsightful evalua-
tions. 
In terms of specific tests of the study hypotheses, analytical 
comparisons again confirmed the presence of hindsight bias. Specifi-
cally, subjects in the unfavorable condition gave significantly lower 
probability estimates of a favorable patient outcome than did subjects 
in either the favorable condition, F (1,156)=49.24, or the control con-
dition, £ (1,156)=33.84. Control subjects did not give significantly 
different estimates than subjects in the favorable condition. 
Support of the hypothesis that malpractice information would exag-
gerate the hindsight effect was not found. However, analytical compar-
isons did expose the nature of a significant interaction effect found in 
the univariate analysis between outcome condition and subject gender, F 
(3,144)=2.74. Male subjects in the malpractice condition assigned lower 
probabilities to the chances of a favorable patient outcome than did 
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men in the unfavorable condition (47.75~ versus 54.50~, respectively). 
However, signficant differences were not found between the group means. 
In contrast, female subjects in the favorable and malpractice conditions 
were found to give significantly different estimates, I (1,156)=7.77. 
But, as discovered with the second likelihood estimate, the difference 
was in the opposite direction than hypothesized for all subjects. Spe-
cifically, the average value for women in the unfavorable condition was 
45. 50~o as compared to a value of 62. 25~o for women in the malpractice 
condition. The gender by condition interaction did not affect the over-
all significance or the overall pattern of results for the earlier tests 
of the first study hypothesis. 
Open-ended Versus Forced-Sum Measures 
To allow comparisons with prior research on hindsight bias, all of 
the preceding analyses were conducted with forced-sum probability esti-
mates. A secondary goal of the present research was to repeat the same 
sequence of analyses with an open-ended probability measure to determine 
whether the hindsight bias effect would generalize across a different 
type of dependent measure. Thus, for the third prediction, i.e. the 
outcome-specific prediction, subjects were asked to generate both 
open-ended and forced-sum probability estimates. (See Method for a 
detailed description of the open-ended estimates.) Before pursuing the 
univariate analyses of variance with the open-ended estimate, the corre-
lation between the forced-sum and open-ended estimate of the favorable 
patient outcome was calculated and found to be moderate ( ! =.63). 
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As with the forced-sum estimate, the univariate analysis of vari-
ance revealed significant mean differences as a function of outcome con-
dition, I (3,156)=13.61. Based on the open-ended estimate, there was 
little difference in mean predictions of a favorable patient outcome 
between subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions, (53.9% 
and 54.0%, respectively). This was also true using the forced-sum esti-
mate. There was more difference in mean response with the open-ended 
estimate between subjects in the favorable and control conditions (77.0% 
and 65.9%, respectively) than found with the forced-sum estimate. How-
ever, the major result found with the forced-sum estimate was replicated 
with the open-ended measure. Subjects in the unfavorable and malprac-
tice conditions assigned lower open-ended probabilities to the favorable 
outcome than subjects in either the control or favorable conditions. 
Two main effects were found with the open-ended estimate that were 
not found with the forced-sum estimate. There was a trend for women to 
assign higher open-ended probabilities to the favorable patient outcome 
than men, 65.88% versus 50.50%, respectively, I (1,144)=4.73. A closer 
examination of cell means did not reveal a pattern for the gender dif-
ferential to be more clearly associated with some outcome conditions 
more than others. The second main effect involved the case factor. Con-
sistent with prior results, a favorable Shirley outcome received higher 
open-ended estimates than did a favorable George outcome(66.19% versus 
59. 19~o, respectively), I ( 1, 144 )=5. 70. A closer examination of cell 
means revealed that the largest case differential was between subjects 
in the unfavorable condition. Specifically, Shirley subjects in the 
unfavorable condition assigned higher open-ended probabilities to a fav-
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orable patient outcome than did George subjects in the unfavorable con-
dition (60. O~o versus 47. 8~c,, respectively). There were no signficant 
differences in variances among the outcome conditions as found with the 
forced-sum measure. 
Analytical comparisons with the open-ended estimate confirmed the 
first study hypothesis. As with the forced-sum measure, subjects who 
received unfavorable patient outcome information gave significantly 
lower open-ended probabilities than subjects who received either favora-
ble patient outcome information, E (1,156)= 29.64,or no patient outcome 
information, E (1,156)= 7.98. In contrast to results with the forced-
sum measure, analytical comparisons revealed differences in open-ended 
estimates between favorable and control subjects, E (1,156)=6.85. Sub-
jects who received favorable patient outcome information tended to give 
higher predictions of a favorable patient outcome than subjects who 
received no patient outcome information (77.00~ versus 
64.88~,respectively). Finally, support of the hypothesis that malprac-
tice information would exaggerate the hindsight effect was not found 
with the open-ended estimate. Subjects in the unfavorable and malprac-
tice conditions did not differ in their open-ended estimates. 
Hindsight Bias and Evaluative Judgment 
The Evaluation Index 
A final major hypothesis of the present study stated that hind-
sight bias would influence subjects' ratings of the quality of Dr. M. 's 
judgment. Specifically, the expectation was that subjects in the unfa-
vorable condition would rate Dr. M. 's judgment less favorably than sub-
52 
jects in either the favorable or control conditions. It was also 
hypothesized that the hindsight bias would be exaggerated with informa-
tion about consequences facing the expert. Specifically, the expecta-
tion was that subjects in the malpractice condition would give more 
unfavorable ratings of Dr. M. 's judgment than would subjects in the 
unfavorable condition. As a measure of subjects' evaluations of Dr. 
M. 's judgment, a global evaluation index was calculated for each sub-
ject. This index was the average response to four different ratings. 
In each case, higher values represented more favorable evaluations of 
Dr. M. 's judgment. Before conducting analytical comparisons as specific 
tests of the study hypotheses, an analysis of variance was conducted 
that confirmed an overall significant effect of outcome condition on the 
global evaluation index, I (3,156)=40.52. As seen in Table 3, subjects 
in both the unfavorable and malpractice conditions gave lower evalua-
tions of Dr. M. 's judgment than did subjects in either the control or 
favorable conditons. 
Along with a significant group effect, there was also a signifi-
cant case effect, £ (1,144)=4.41. Subjects assigned to read Shirley's 
case gave more favorable evaluations of Dr. M. 's judgment than George 
subjects (4.25 versus 3.98, respectively). Closer examination of the 
cell means revealed that the case differential was most pronounced for 
subjects in the unfavorable condition. Shirley subjects in the unfavo-
rable condition assigned more favorable ratings to Dr. M. 's judgment 
than did George subjects in the unfavorable condition (3.62 versus 2.91, 
respectively). 
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Table 3 also shows that the variability associated with the group 
mean responses was significantly different as a function of outcome 
information, Cochrans C =.38. Subjects receiving unfavorable outcome 
information, in either the unfavorable or malpractice conditions, were 
significantly more variable in their responses than subjects who 
received favorable outcome information. The largest difference in group 
variability was found between subjects in the unfavorable and the favor-
able conditions. Specifically, subjects in the unfavorable condition 
were more than twice as variable in their overall evaluation of Dr. M. 's 
judgment as subjects in the favorable condition. Table 3 also shows 
that there was minimal difference in group variability on the evaluation 
index for subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions. Thus, 
receiving unfavorable outcome information extended the range of subject 
ratings and significantly diminished the value of the ratings for eval-
uative judgment as it did for certain measures of predictive judgment. 
After confirming the overall effect of outcome information on sub-
jects' evaluations of Dr. M. 's judgment, analytical comparisons were 
conducted to test the specific study hypotheses. The first study 
hypothesis, specifically that unfavorable outcome information would 
diminish subjects' ratings of the quality of Dr. M. 's judgment, was con-
firmed. Negative outcome information biased subjects' evaluations in 
the predicted direction. Specifically, subjects in the unfavorable con-
diton gave signficantly lower expert evaluations than subjects who 
received favorable patient outcome information, £ ( 1, 156)=92. 52, and 
than subjects who received no patient outcome information, F 
(1,156)=54.ll. Significant differences were also found between subjects 
54 
who received favorable patient outcome information and control subjects, 
F (1,156)=5.12. On the average, subjects who received favorable outcome 
information were more impressed with Dr. M. 's judgment than subjects who 
had no access to outcome information. 
The hypothesis stating that mention of a malpractice suit would 
exaggerate the bias was not confirmed by the analytical comparisons. 
As seen in Table 3, subjects in the malpractice and unfavorable condi-
tions did not differ in their evaluations of Dr M. 
Table 3 
Global Evaluation Index by Outcome Condition 
Outcome Condition 
Dependent Measure Control Favorable Unfavorable Malpractice N F df .r_ 
Global Evaluation 
Index 
Mean 4.58 5.05 3.26 3.57 160 40.52 (3,156) <.OS 
SD* .73 .40 1.03 1.01 
*statistically significant; Cochrans C = .38 
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Selected Eval~ative Judgments 
Along with the ind~x items, other evaluative questions were 
included on the questionnaire to explore possible relationships with 
certain types of outcome information. These questions assessed: (a) the 
proportion of blame assigned to Dr. M. for the unfavorable patient out-
come; (b) agreement with four descriptive statements about the nature of 
the case and alternative treatment plans; and (c) rank orderings of Dr. 
M.'s treatment recommendation relative to four alternative treatment 
solutions. Subject responses to these dependent measures were compared 
as a function of the four outcome conditions. 
The analysis of variance was used to test mean differences in the 
proportion of blame assigned to Dr. M. as a function of the four outcome 
conditions. Significant mean differences were found, E (2,177)=3.79. 
However, the overall mean differences were not interpretable because of 
a significant group by case interaction, E (2,108)=3.66. Table 4 shows 
that among Shirley subjects, those in the unfavorable condition assigned 
the least amount of blame to Dr. M. For George subjects, the group 
means were not significantly different. These results might be related 
to the recurring finding that Shirley subjects in the unfavorable condi-
tion expressed more predictive agreement and more evaluative support of 
Dr. M. 's judgment than did George subjects in the unfavorable condition. 
Table 4 
Supplemental Evaluations as a Function of Outcome Condition 
Evaluation Item Control Favorable Unfavorable Malpractice N F df 
Proportion of Blame 
Assigned to Dr. M. 
Shirley Subjects 51.5% NA* 22.6% 45.0% 60 8.18 (2,57) 
George Subjects 66.6% NA* 62.9% 59.0% 60 .48 (2,57) 
Agreement of Need for 
More Conservative 
Treatment** 3.42 3.42 4.82 4. 77 158 12.80 (3,155) 
*The question of blame was not relevant to subjects who received favorable outcome information. 
**The agreement scale ranged from "l" (disagree strongly) to 11 611 (agree strongly). 
<.05 
NS 
<.05 
VI 
-...J 
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Subjects were asked to use a six point Likert 'scale to indicate 
their level of agreement with four statements that summarized possible 
points of contention between foresightful and hindsightful observers. 
These points addressed: (a) the perceived difficulty of the clinical 
case; (b) the perceived need for more patient information before making 
a treatment recommendation; (c) the perceived need for a professional 
consultation before making a treatment recommendation; and (d) the per-
ceived need for a more conservative treatment plan than the one Dr. M. 
recommended. In Shirley's case, the more conservative treatment plan 
recommended that Shirley see a physician immediately. In George's 
case, the more conservative treatment plan involved keeping George in 
the hospital. 
Outcome condition did not have a significant influence on the per-
ceived need for more patient information or on the perceived need for a 
professional consultation. Nor did outcome information influence sub-
jects' assessments of the overall difficulty of the case. However, as 
presented in Table 4, subjects' level of agreement regarding the need 
for the more conservative treatment approach was found to be a function 
of outcome condition, £ (3,155)=12.80. Subjects in the unfavorable or 
malpractice conditions were more likely to agree with the need for a 
more conservative treatment approach. A case effect was also found, [ 
(1,137)=78.90. Overall, Shirley subjects were more likely to agree with 
this need than were George subjects(4.96 versus 3.39, respectively). 
In addition, subjects were asked to rank order five treatment 
plans from "l"(most preferred) to "S"(least preferred). Along with Dr. 
M. 's specific recommendation for Shirley or George, other treatment 
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solutions listed included: (a) arranging for more patient informa-
tion; Cb) discussing the case with other professionals;(c) recommending a 
somewhat more cautious approach than Dr. M.; and (d) recommending a much 
more cautious approach than Dr. M. In Shirley's case, the somewhat more 
cautious treatment plan involved advising her to see a physician if her 
physical problems continued; the much more cautious plan advised her to 
see a physician immediately. In George's case, the somewhat more cau-
tious plan advised him to enter a halfway house; the much more cautious 
plan referred George immediately to the psychiatric unit of the hospi-
tal. 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance was calculated to determine 
whether subjects within conditions tended to rank order the five treat-
ment plans similarly. Given previous differences associated with case, 
Kendall's test for concordance was conducted separately for Shirley and 
for George subjects. As summarized in Table 5, agreement was found 
within each outcome condition for subjects assigned to read George's 
case history. However, only Shirley subjects in the unfavorable and 
control conditions were found to give homogeneous ratings to the five 
items. 
Table 5 
Within Group Agreement on Item Rank Orderings by Case 
Shirley George 
Group W* x2 df N p_ W* x2 df N p_ 
Control .26 20.52 4 20 < • 05 .21 15.86 4 19 < .05 
Favorable .03 2.99 4 19 NS .46 32.04 4 18 < .05 
Unfavorable .21 16.04 4 19 < • 05 .19 15.10 4 20 < • 05 
Malpractice .11 7.79 4 18 NS .31 23.69 4 19 < • 05 
*Kendall's coefficient of concordance ranges from "O" (no agreement) to "l" (total agreement). 
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To examine whether the specific rank order assigned to each of 
the five items was influenced by the outcome information subjects had 
received, an analysis of group effects was conducted. Table 6 presents 
the results based on Kruskall Wallis' test. Although Kruskall Wallis' 
test uses the sum of the rank orderings to test group differences, Table 
6 presents the mean rank ordering associated with each outcome condition 
to maintain consistency with the response units of the questionnaire 
item. Because the original rank orderings ranged from 11 111 (most prefer-
red) to 115 11 (least preferred), higher means represent less subject pref-
erence. As seen in Table 6, the rank ordering of two of the five treat-
ment plans was significantly different as a function of outcome 
condition, specifically, Dr. M.'s treatment recommendation, ! 2 (2, N 
=153)=28.94, and the most conservative treatment alternative, ! 2 (2, ~ 
=154)=22.45. Subjects in the unfavorable and malpractice conditions 
expressed less preference for Dr. M. 's treatment plan and more prefer-
ence for the most conservative treatment plan than did subjects in 
either the favorable or control conditions. The case factor did not 
influence either the overall significance of these latter findings or 
the overall pattern of results. 
Table 6 
Rank Ordering of Two Treatment Plans as a Function of Outcome Condition* 
Dr. M.'s Treatment Plan 
Most Conservative 
Treatment Plan 
Control 
2.69 
4.03 
Favorable 
2.68 
3.95 
Unfavorable Malpractice 
3.98 3. 71 
2.72 3.08 
x2 df N 
28.94 2 153 < .05 
22.45 2 154 < • 05 
*Subjects rank ordered five treatment plans from "l" (most preferred) to "5" (least preferred). 
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Additional analyses were conducted with the goal of uncovering 
other potentially useful information about biased evaluations of an 
expert's judgment. After testing the original study hypotheses, it was 
thought that some of the supplemental evaluation items that were not 
significantly different across the four outcome conditions might differ 
as a function of another reclassification of subjects. Specifically, it 
seemed possible that subjects who evidenced the most hindsight bias 
relative to their peers might have assigned more blame to Dr. M., 
expressed more preference for gathering more patient information and 
for arranging for a professional consultation , and be less likely to 
perceive the case as difficult than other subjects who received unfavo-
rable patient outcome information and than other subjects who received 
either favorable or no patient outcome information. 
Operationally, this new subgroup of subjects, called the "hind-
sight group" was identified by their responses to the major dependent 
measures of the study, namely the three forced-sum prediction estimates 
and the overall evaluation index. Twenty-two subjects qualified as the 
"hindsight group." These subjects, who had all received unfavorable 
patient outcome information from either the unfavorable or malpractice 
condition, gave an average estimate of the three favorable patient-
related outcomes that was more than one-half of a standard deviation 
(more than 10 percentage points) below the mean for all other subjects 
receiving the same unfavorable patient outcome. Further, these subjects 
gave an overall rating of Dr. M. that was more than one-half of a stan-
dard deviation (more than . 45 units) below all other subjects who 
received the same unfavorable patient outcome information. Once identi-
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fied by these criteria, these 22 subjects represented 13 men and 9 
women. However, they disporportionately represented subjects assigned 
to George's case, ~2 (2, ~ =22)=6.27. Specifically, 73% of the hind-
sight group had been assigned to George's case. This result was not 
surprising given the recurring finding that George subjects in the unfa-
vorable and malpractice conditions assigned lower probabilities to the 
major dependent prediction measures than did Shirley subjects in the 
unfavorable and malpractice conditions. The hindsight group (Group I in 
Tables 7 and 8) was compared with all other subjects who did not meet 
the above criteria, but who had also been assigned to the unfavorable or 
malpractice conditions (Group II in Tables 7 and 8), and with the 
remaining study subjects for whom hindsight bias was not applicable, 
namely those in the favorable or control conditions (Group III in Tables 
7 and 8). 
Univariate analyses of variance with each of the auxilliary evalu-
ation items did not reveal significant mean differences in subjects' 
perceptions of the need for a professional consultation,for more patient 
information, or in perceptions of the overall case difficulty as a func-
tion of the new three-group reclassification. However, Table 7 shows 
that two results from the analyses of variance were significant as a 
function of the new classification. 
Table 7 
A Comparison of Supplemental Evaluations as a Function of Post Hoc Reclassification* 
Evaluation Item 
Percent Blame Assigned 
to Dr. M. for Unfavorable 
Patient Outcome** 
Agreement with Need for 
More Conservative 
Treatment 
Group I Group II 
66.6% 40.1% 
5.18 4.65 
Group III N F df 
59.0% 120 11.26 (2,117) 
3.42 159 20.79 (2,156) 
< • 05 
< • 05 
*The post hoc reclassification distinguished among students who received unfavorable outcome 
,information and demonstrated the most hindsight bias on the principle dependent measures relative 
to their peers (Group I,~= 21-22), students who also received unfavorable outcome information but 
who did not fulfill the bias criteria for Group I (Group II, N = 55-58), and all other subjects who 
received either favorable or no patient outcome information (Group III,~= 76-80). 
**The question of blame was not relevant to subjects who received favorable outcome information. 
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First, an overall group difference was found regarding the amount 
of blame assigned to Dr. M., ! (2,117)=11.26. Interestingly, the larg-
est mean difference occurred between the hindsight group and Group II 
subjects who also received unfavorable patient outcome information 
(66. 66~0 versus 40. 09~o, respectively), and not between the hindsight 
group and Group III subjects who received either favorable or no patient 
outcome information (66.6~ versus 59.1~,respectively). Second, Table 7 
shows that the reclassified subgroups also differed in their level of 
agreement with the need for a more conservative treatment approach, ! 
(2, 156 )=20. 79. As seen in Table 7, there was a 1. 76 unit difference 
between the hindsight group and the group of subjects who received oppo-
site or no patient outcome. Of the three groups, the hindsight group 
agreed the most with the need for a most conservative approach. 
Although the pattern of results was different for the item on blame, the 
same two dependent measures were significantly different across the 
three-group classification as they were across the original four study 
conditions. Thus, the new classification supported rather than added to 
the information already discovered in the original analyses. 
The rank ordering of treatment plans was also examined as a func-
tion of the three-group classification. Kendall coefficient of concor-
dance was calculated to determine whether subjects within these three 
groups tended to rank order the five treatment plans similiarly. Sig-
nificant agreement was found within each of the three groups. The rank 
orderings of the five treatment plans were examined to determine if they 
varied as a function of the three group reclassification. As discovered 
with the four group comparison , the Kruskall Wallis test for the three 
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group comparison uncovered mean differences with the ranking of Dr. M. 's 
treatment plan, x 2 (4, ~ =153)=37 .12, and of the most conservative 
treatment plan, x 2 (4, ~ =154)=22.25. (See Table 8.) However, in con-
trast to the four group comparison, a third mean rank was also found to 
differ among the three redefined subgroups. As seen in Table 8, there 
was an overall difference found with the ranking of the need for more 
patient information, x 2 (4, N =153)=8.40. The Group I subjects, the 
hindsight group, expressed more preference for gathering additional 
patient information than did both Group II subects who also received 
unfavorable patient outcome information and Group III subjects who 
received favorable or no patient outcome information. Thus, subjects 
who evidenced the most hindsight bias were more likely than all other 
subjects to perceive a need for more patient information before making a 
definitive recommendation. 
Table 8 
A Comparison of Rank Ordered Treatment Plans as a Function of Post Hoc Reclassification* 
Group I Group II Group III x2 df N 
.P. 
Dr. M.'s Treatment Plan 4.54 3.56 2.68 37.16 4 153 < .05 
Most Conservative 
Treatment Plan 2.68 2.98 3.99 22.25 4 154 < • 05 
Plan to Arrange for More 
Patient Information 1.95 3.07 2.78 8.40 4 153 < .05 
*Subjects rank ordered five treatment plans from "l" (most preferred) to "5" (lesat preferred). 
The post hoc reclassification distinguished among students who received unfavorable outcome 
information and demonstrated the most hindsight bias on the principle dependent measures relative 
to their peers (Group I, N = 21-22), students who also received unfavorable outcome information 
but who did not fulfill the bias criteria for Group I (Group II, N = 55), andallother subjects 
who received either favorable or no patient outcome information (Group III,~= 76-77). 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Overview 
The present study was designed to assess three new questions 
regarding the generality of hindsight bias: (1) do the predictive dis-
tortions associated with outcome information generalize to a context 
that includes a dissenting expert judgment? (2) does unfavorable outcome 
information bias evaluative judgment as it has been found to bias pre-
dictive judgment? (3) does mention of a malpractice suit exaggerate any 
predictive and evaluative distortions associated with outcome informa-
tion? After discussing the results pertaining to each of these ques-
tions, the larger theoretical and applied implications of the present 
study will be explored. 
Biased Predictive Judgment 
Results of the present study provide consistent evidence that 
unfavorable outcome information biases subjective perceptions of pre-
dictive judgment. Across three prediction tasks, subjects who received 
unfavorable patient outcome information reported significantly less 
agreement with the expert than subjects who received either favorable or 
no patient outcome information. That is, when the outcome contradicted 
the expert judgment, subjects considered it comparatively unlikely that 
they would: (a) have made the same clinical assessment;(b) have recom-
mended the same treatment; or (c) have anticipated a favorable patient 
response given the expert assessment and treatment solution. 
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These findings extend the domain of hindsight bias. 
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The pre-
dictive distortions previously found as a function of outcome informa-
tion were found to generalize to a context that includes a dissenting 
expert judgment. Prior research has consistently shown that outcome 
information biases people's impressions of their predictive capabilities 
(Fischhoff, 1975a,1975b,1977; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). In hindsight, 
people consistently overestimate what they would have foreseen without 
the.benefit of hindsight. Although the implication that hindsight bias 
holds for the fairness of evaluating other decision-makers has been 
acknowledged (Fischhoff, 1975a, 1982a; Hogarth, 1980), this study pro-
vided the first direct test of the relationship between outcome informa-
tion that contradicts a prior decision and subjects' assessments of 
their predictive judgment relative to the original decision-maker. 
Moreover, results showed that reporting an expert judgment that was 
inconsistent with the outcome did not undermine the power of outcome 
information to alter subjects' assessments of their predictive prowess. 
Subjects did not defer to the expert judgment. Rather, they reported a 
superior capacity to anticipate the likelihood of unfavorable events as 
compared to subjects who received either favorable or no outcome infor-
mation. The influence of hindsight bias on subjects' assessments of 
their predictive capabilities was found across both forced-sum and 
open-ended probability measures, indicating that the hindsight effect in 
this context is not restricted to one type of response format. 
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Although the major hypotheses addressed the power of unfavorable 
outcome information to decrease predictive agreement, it was interesting 
to note that receiving confirmatory outcome information did not signifi-
cantly increase predictive agreement as compared to receiving no outcome 
information. The data from the present study revealed no significant 
mean differences on any of the three prediction measures between sub-
jects who received favorable outcome information and control subjects 
who received no outcome information. Both subject groups tended to 
agree with the expert predictions. Thus, in the absence of outcome 
information, subjects seemed to defer to the expert judgment. 
Biased Evaluative Judgment 
The domain of hindsight bias was further extended by examining the 
relationship between receiving outcome information that contradicted an 
expert judgment and subsequent evaluations of that expert. As hypoth-
esized, the receipt of outcome information systematically biased sub-
jects' average ratings of the expert as it did their assessments of 
their predictive capabilities. Subjects who received unfavorable out-
come information not only presumed superior predictive capabilities as 
compared to the expert, but they evaluated Dr. M. 's clinical judgment 
more harshly than subjects who received either favorable or no patient 
outcome information. 
These results extend evidence of hindsight bias from predictive 
to evaluative judgment. Subjects who received unfavorable outcome 
information tended to believe not only that they would have made differ-
ent decisions than the expert, but that the expert should have made dif-
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ferent decisions. As hypothezized, the expert was held accountable for 
not seeing possibilities that were only apparent to subjects in hind-
sight. 
Secondary analyses were conducted to examine whether receiving 
favorable outcome information produced more favorable expert evaluations 
than not receiving outcome information. Unlike the comparisons of pre-
dictive agreement, significant mean differences were found in expert 
ratings between subjects in the favorable and control conditions. Spe-
cifically, subjects who received favorable outcome information were more 
impressed with Dr. M. 's judgment than subjects who did not receive any 
information about the patient's subsequent response to treatment. Thus, 
outcome information that seems to confirm an expert judgment does appear 
to increase the perceived favorableness of that judgment; and outcome 
information that contradicts an expert judgment appears to decrease the 
perceived favorableness of that judgment. 
The Influence of Context 
In addition to demonstrating that the hindsight bias phenomenon 
could be generalized to a context that included another person's judg-
ment, it was of interest to test whether the predictive and evaluative 
distortions could be manipulated by another contextual factor. Specifi-
cally, it was hypothesized that mention of a pending malpractice suit 
would exaggerate the predictive and evaluative distortions associated 
with outcome information. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. 
Opposite differences than were hypothesized were found on two of the 
three prediction measures. Specifically, subjects who read of a malp-
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ractice suit reported signficantly more predictive agreement with the 
expert than subjects who read only of an unfavorable patient outcome. 
That is, overall, they considered it more likely that they would recom-
mend the same treatment plan as Dr. M. and more likely that a favorable 
patient outcome would eventuate than did subjects who received unfavora-
ble outcome information without any mention of a malpractice suit. In 
addition, the data analyses revealed an unanticipated gender by condi-
tion interaction for the outcome-specific prediction. Among the men, 
subject predictions did not vary as a function of the malpractice infor-
mation. However, among the women, subjects in the malpractice condition 
reported more predictive agreement with the expert than did subjects in 
the unfavorable condition. Yet, no differences were found in the average 
rating of the quality of the expert judgment between subjects who 
received unfavorable patient outcome information and those who also 
received mention of a malpractice suit. 
The fact that the subjects in the malpractice condition expressed 
more predictive agreement with the expert than other subjects who 
received unfavorable outcome information might reflect attitudes towards 
malpractice. Although mention of malpractice was intended to heighten 
the sense of gravity associated with the expert "error," it may have 
instead prompted certain feelings of compassion for the expert. A recent 
Newsweek article (Press, 1986) suggested that an awareness of the grow-
ing number of invalid malpractice claims has generated a new wave of 
support for physicians charged with malpractice. Students in the pres-
ent study were perhaps more likely to side with the expert because of a 
similiar attitude towards the inappropriate use of malpractice litiga-
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tion. There is no apparent explanation for the influence of gender on 
this pattern of result. 
In addition to this unanticipated context effect, the data pro-
vided some intriguing hints that the relative impact of unfavorable out-
come information on predictive and evaluative judgment may depend on 
other characteristics of the situation. In addition to thes malpractice 
effect discussed above, several analyses indicated an overall case 
effect. The case effect reflected the fact that Shirley subjects 
reported more predictive and evaluative agreement with the expert than 
George subjects. A closer examination of cell means revealed that the 
case differential was most pronounced among subjects who received unfa-
vorable patient outcome information. Specifically, the unfavorable 
Shirley outcome generated more agreement with the expert than the unfa-
vorable George outcome. 
There are several factors that might account for the differential 
impact of these two cases. The case materials were different on a vari-
ety of dimensions including patient gender, age, family situation, and 
symptomotology. Although case effects were not found in the related 
study of outcome information and social explanation (Ross, Lepper, 
Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977), it is important to reiterate that Shirley's 
case was modified for use in the present study. Specifically, all men-
tion of her violent thoughts toward her son were excluded after it was 
found to minimize the perceived credibility of her recovery among pilot 
subjects. 
Although the case histories were very different, it seems more 
likely that the case effect was related to the case endings. The unfa-
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vorable patient outcomes designed for Shirley and for George were 
intended to reflect different kinds of judgmental error. The case end-
ing designed for Shirley was intended to illustrate a protocol error. 
Although Dr. M. recognized Shirley's emotional needs and recommended 
weekly psychotherapy, Dr. M. failed to refer Shirley to a physician as a 
routine precautionary check on possible physical pathology. In con-
trast, the unfavorable case ending written for George was intended to 
reflect a judgmental miscalculation of the extent of patient psychopa-
thology; Dr. M. failed to prescribe the right amount of psychological 
help. The subjects who read of George's unfavorable response reported 
comparatively little predictive agreement or evaluative support of the 
expert. However, based on the comparatively supportive responses that 
Dr. M. received from Shirley subjects, it seems possible that subjects 
perceived Shirley's cerebral tumor to have represented a distinct prob-
lem outside of Dr. M. 's domain of responsibility. This interpretation is 
supported by the results of the analyses on subjects' forced-sum assign-
ments of blame to Dr. M. and the patient. Shirley subjects in the unfa-
vorable condition assigned significantly less blame to Dr. M. as com-
pared to Shirley subjects in the other conditions. 
There is no direct way to ascertain whether subjects discriminate 
between these two kinds of errors, whether the two kinds of errors were 
appropriately depicted,or whether the distinction is a meaningful one in 
terms of the hindsight effect on judgment. These issues furnish possi-
ble topics for future research. However, there was evidence in the pres-
ent study to suggest that the unfavorable Shirley outcome was less 
salient than the unfavorable George outcome. As discussed earlier, 10 
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of the 12 subjects who failed the manipulation check were assigned to 
read the unfavorable ending for Shirley. Eight of these 10 subjects 
mistakenly reported that there was no outcome information included in 
the case history. It may be that these subjects, introductory psychol-
ogy students fulfilling a course requirement, were particularly attuned 
to psychological issues and looking for psychological outcomes. Thus, 
they were more likely to miss the information rega~ding Shirley's cere-
bral tumor. This interpretation is consistent with prior research show-
ing that people's schemas for thinking about a situation guide their 
attention to information and interpretation of that information (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984). The many clues identified by these data clearly indicate 
that more research is needed to explore possible contextual effects that 
might mediate the predictive and evaluative distortions associated with 
unfavorable outcome information. 
Variability Differences As A Function Of Outcome Information 
The results of this present investigation revealed not only the 
mean differences described above, but they also uncovered significant 
variance differences as a function of outcome condition. Specifically, 
subjects who received unfavorable outcome information were more variable 
in their responses than subjects who received either favorable or no 
outcome information for the outcome-specific prediction and for the 
global evaluation measure. The same trend, although not reaching sta-
tistical significance, was apparent in the other two prediction meas-
ures. Although an unexpected pattern, this increased variability may 
represent another meaningful concommitant of the hindsight effect. It 
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may be that information of an expert judgment and of a contradictory 
outcome is not combined or interpreted in a uniform way for all people. 
If the effect is not an experimental artifact associated only with this 
study, it would be important to include measures of other potentially 
relevant cognitive factors to better interpret the increased variabil-
ity. Research in person memory (Hastie & Kumar, 1979) and on social 
salience (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) has considered attention as crucial to 
the ways that people deal with inconsistent information. For example, 
Taylor and Fiske found that when someone in a group was made salient, 
subjects tended to see that person as causing whatever was happening. 
Further research should investigate whether the variability differences 
associated with outcome information replicate across other experimental 
contexts and, if so, whether these differences are mediated by various 
cognitive factors such as differential attention to inconsistent infor-
mation. 
Methodological Considerations 
Before reviewing the theoretical significance of these findings in 
greater detail, several methodological considerations that influence the 
interpretation of these findings require mention. Several of these con-
siderations pertain to the interpretation of the overall effect of out-
come information on subject responses, while others pertain to issues 
of external validity. In all, they identify several directions for 
future research. First, although judgmental differences were found in 
the predicted direction as a function of outcome groups, it is possible 
that the overall influence of outcome information was mediated by a 
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recency effect. In all but the control condition, the last information 
that subjects received pertained to the patient response to treatment. 
There has been some evidence for recency effects in similiar experimen-
tal tasks. For example, Arkkelin et al. (1979) found that the last 
information given to subjects was the most readily utilized information 
in a judgment task. Although recency effects have not consistently been 
found to influence judgmental responses (Frieze, 1976), it would 
strengthen the generalizability of these results to counter-balance the 
textual position of the outcome information. 
The overall influence of outcome information on subjects' pre-
dictive and evaluative responses may also have been effected by the 
"concreteness" of the outcome information. Cognitive research has con-
sistently demonstrated that concrete information, i.e., vivid informa-
tion or information that described specific events, is more likely to be 
attended to and recalled than abstract information, i.e., summary or 
interpretive information (Hogarth, 1980). For example, Reyes, Thomp-
son, and Bower (1980) reported that, in a mock jury decision task, sub-
jects recalled more "vivid" than "pallid" evidence and that subjects' 
judgments of apparent guilt paralleled their differential recall. The 
outcome information for all conditions in the present study was cer-
tainly more concrete than much of the preceding case material. 
Although information concreteness is a potentially important factor, it 
again does not account for the between group differences. 
Other methodological considerations pertain to external validity 
issues. It is perhaps difficult to identify circumstances in contempo-
rary life that exactly parallel the experimental conditions in the pres-
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ent study. In a review of recent decision-making studies, Ebbeson and 
Konecni (1980) expressed general concern about the external validity of 
decision-making research that relies on laborary simulation of real 
world phenomena. In this instance, it is hard to imagine college stu-
dents being asked to use a 3000 word case history to evaluate the clini-
cal judgment of a psychologist. Two external validity issues are imme-
diately apparent. First, there is the intuitively obvious difference in 
level of expertise. The use of process research, specifically, thinking-
aloud protocols,has revealed that expert and novice clinicians employ 
different interpretations of patient data cues as well as qualitatively 
distinct "lines of reasoning" in reaching clinical judgments (Johnson, 
Hassebrock, Duran, & Moller, 1982). Carroll (1978,1980) also reported 
results of expert-novice differences in the conceptualization of parole 
decisions. Nevertheless, although clinical psychologists are more 
appropriately trained than college students to render clinical judg-
ments, there is evidence to show that they are not different than other 
experts or than college students in their susceptibility to hindsight 
bias (Arkes et al., 1981; Detmer et al., 1978) or to other cognitive 
biases in judgment (Casscells et al., 1978; Chapman & Chapman, 1982; 
Eddy, 1982; Oskamp, 1982). Thus, it is doubtful that the hindsight 
effects would be limited to the· context of the present study for reasons 
pertaining to expert-novice differences. 
One could even argue that the present design provided a more con-
servative test of the effect of outcome information on evaluations of 
others' decisions. College students might be more likely than expert 
clinicians to defer to an expert decision without an independent review 
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of the evidence. As discussed earlier, control subjects, who did not 
receive any outcome information, did not differ from the subjects who 
received favorable outcome information in their level of predictive 
agreement with the expert. Thus, in the absence of outcome information, 
subjects tended to agree with the expert predictions. In any case, it 
would be important in future research to vary the expertise of the sub-
ject populations to determine the generalizability of the results 
reported here. 
The second limitation to external validity pertains to the anonym-
ity of subject responses. Subjects in the present study were assured of 
the complete anonymity of their responses. Research has shown that 
subjects' private perceptions and their public judgments are not neces-
sarily similar (Ross & Anderson, 1982). It is impossible to determine 
whether the responses from the present study represented subjects' pub-
lic judgments, their private judgments, whether their private and public 
judgments are identical, or whether subjects even have a real opinion on 
the questions that they were asked. Shelley Taylor (1976) noted that in 
many experiments, subjects are presented with a lot of information and 
asked to answer a series of questions. In effect, the experimenter is 
asking: Now that you have put everything together, what do you conclude? 
Taylor noted that the more appropriate question might be: How are you 
putting this information together and do you have any conclusions? In 
the present study, it is possible that subjects did not feel equipped to 
make patient-related predictions or to evaluate the expert. However, 
behaving as most study subjects (Carroll, 1980), they answered the ques-
tions anyway. In terms of external validity, the concern here has less 
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to do with whether subjects had the appropriate information or training 
to make the judgments as compared to clinical psychologists. There are 
certainly countless experiences in contemporary life that one can point 
to where individuals make decisions or volunteer opinions based on 
insufficient information. The concern here has more to do with whether 
subjects' were reporting their considered opinions on the topics. 
Although resolution of this issue is not required for discussion of the 
between group differences, it does point to the need for process 
research to 
made. 
explore how hindsightful predictions and evaluations are 
The Objectivity of Second-Guessing 
Theoretical Significance 
The present results provide important new evidence of hindsight 
bias. Most importantly, these results generalize evidence of hindsight 
bias to the process of second-guessing the decisions of other people. 
Specifically, these results demonstrate that the predictive distortions 
associated with outcome information generalize to a context that 
includes another person's judgment. Further, these results demonstrated 
that evaluative distortions result as a function of outcome information. 
Secondary analyses revealed that outcome information did not have a con-
sistent influence on all evaluative questions. Of the nine auxilliary 
evaluation items, only two were significantly different as a function of 
outcome information. Further, a reclassification of subjects based on 
the relative amount of predictive and evaluative distortions apparent 
in their responses did substantially change the overall pattern of 
results. 
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Taken together, these findings expand our knowledge of hindsight 
bias. They may also have relevance to the "fundamental attributional 
error" (Ross, 1977), which refers to people's tendency to underestimate 
the situational constraints on others' behavior. For instance,the dis-
counting of situational constraints was powerfully demonstrated in an 
experiment conducted by Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977). In a simu-
lated quiz game, both the contestants and observers of the experiment 
believed that the questioners really were more knowledgeable than the 
contestants even though everyone was fully aware that the questioner and 
contestant roles were randomly assigned. Jones and Nisbett (1971) sug-
gested that the tendency to underestimate situational factors when 
explaining others' behavior results from the fact that observers and 
actors have different perspectives. When observing, the person occupies 
the center of attention; when acting, the environment commands our 
attention. 
Perhaps the results of the present study reflect a specific 
instance of a more general tendency to underestimate situational factors 
when making inferences about other people. In this instance, hindsight 
subjects seem to discount the situational uncertainty that the original 
decision-maker faced. More research is needed to determine whether or 
not the tendency to underestimate situational uncertainty is a principal 
factor in the predictive and evaluative distortions found in hindsight-
ful evaluations of others' judgment. Discovering the specific cognitive 
factors that cause the bias is critical to understanding many of the 
practical implications of hindsight bias. 
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Applied Implications 
It is likely that we have all questioned a decision made by some-
one else, particularly when things turned out badly as a result of that 
decision. The recent Challenger tragedy has opened up the entire NASA 
organization to the hindsightful evaluations of a nation. Although the 
conventional focus in second-guessing is on the fallibility of their 
judgment, results of the present study suggest that our inferences 
about their judgment are themselves suspect. Once informed of an unfa-
vorable outcome, we tend to believe that we would have made a different 
decision and that the original decision-maker should have made a differ-
ent decision. These inferences do not result from our independent and 
careful review of the same evidence that the original decision-maker 
reviewed; rather, they result from "that special wisdom born of hind-
sight." (Fischhoff, 1975b) 
Because of its grave practical importance, much research has been 
directed at exploring various strategies to remove predictable cognitive 
biases in judgment. Some of the research has investigated ways of 
training people to overcome cognitive biases (e.g.,Carroll & Siegler, 
1977; Fischhoff, 1982b; Fischhoff, Slavic, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Gaeth & 
Shanteau, 1984; Hogarth, 1980; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980; Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980; Pitz & Sachs, 1984; Zechmeister, Rusch, & Markell, in 
press). Other research has been directed at changing the structure of 
decision tasks as a way of eliminating or reducing cognitive bias 
(e.g. ,Hogarth, 1980; Miner, 1984; Rose, Menasco, & Curry, 1982). Prior 
research on hindsight bias has already provided some meaningful clues 
for reducing the bias introduced by outcome information. Specifically, 
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having subjects generate explanations for alternative outcomes has suc-
cessfully eliminated the predictive distortions associated with hind-
sight (Ross et al., 1977). Although it has not been demonstrated in an 
experimental context, Fischhoff (1975b) proposed that that the best way 
to overcome the bias in hindsightful evaluations would be to invite only 
people blind to the outcome to review an uncertain situation and the 
viability of various decisions. Results from the present study strongly 
suggest that cognitive or task interventions are needed to assure the 
objectivity of hindsightful evaluations. 
Taken together, these results have critical implications for 
numerous circumstances in contemporary life that rely on hindsightful 
evaluations to assess people's judgment. It is clear from these find-
ings that undetected hindsight bias undermines the objectivity of those 
evaluations. When an unfortunate event occurs, what is needed is not a 
biased investigation of another's judgment; rather, what is needed and 
fair to all concerned is an unbiased investigation of another's judg-
ment. 
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!IPEBI!!IT SUCCESS 
Instruct ions 
TRIS IS l Y!BY IRPORTltlT STUDY IIYOLYIWG CLI•ICIL 
JODGREIT. WE WEED TO 1109 HOV P!OPL! Lii! YOURSELF JUDGE 
C!BTlII CLIIIClL SITUlTIOWS. Tou are being as~ed to rea~ a 
case history 
case textbook. 
the treat111Pnt. 
reported. 
•uch as it appears in an authentic clinical 
At the time t.he ca~e vas first docuaented, 
recommendation and the outco111e vere not 
As you're rea~ing, pay attention to infor•~tion about the 
pati~nt•s h~c~groon1, formative e~periences, and sympto•s 
that aight help predict later events in the patient's life. 
Clinical ju1gment has auch to do with e%nlainlng past eTents 
and correctly anticipating future events while a•oiding the 
pitfalls of eithe~ overinterpreting or neglecting rele•ant 
case •aterial. ~ltbouqh rou are not trained as a clinician, 
ve are interested in your judg11ents regarding this case. 
Once you••e finished rea1ing the case, 
questions that follow. 'aise your hand 
clarification with the questions. 
l>lease answer t. he 
if you neP~ any 
any clinical case •aterial is •ery sensitl•e. T~erefore. 
it is •ost iaportant that you not discuss t~is case or the 
study questions with anyone either during or after yoar ~ar­
ticipation. Thant you for your cooperation. 
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Shi~ley ~ •• a twenty-three-year-old boasevif~, caae to 
the "ental !ealtb Clinic with a coaolaiat of frequent 
attacks of headaches and di%~iness. After describing these 
sy•'Ptoms, Shirlev adae1 tha+ sho had other orobleas. aainly 
vith her aarriage. She bad always considered berself sex-
ually r~sponsi•e to her husbana, bat lately.she ~ad noticed 
a considerable decrease in her sezual dri•e; frequently she 
had not been able to acbie•e orgasa. lorse still, Shirley 
vas beginning to find her husband's ad•ances repugnant. 
Instea~ of finding satisfaction in their relations, Shirley 
was resortin~ to aasturbation; during these tiaes she 
achieve~ orgas~ while fantasyinq •iolen~ sexual attack by 
•en. nsuallv ~hese were •~n of a ohysical tyoe she had not 
before found attracti•e. 
Shirley, a petite and attracti•e brunette, vas dressed 
si•ply and in excellent taste. Be~ younq ani naturally 
pretty features v~re noticeably aarred by ber e•ident facial 
tension. Her aann~r would change de~naing on •bat she was 
talking about. Por instance, she appeared quite detached 
vben shP related the earl! e•ents in h~r life; ber tone was 
aonotonous, and at tiaes the inter•iever •aa 4ifficalty 
ascertaining if Shirlev vas discus~inq her ovn probleas or 
those of a stranger, e•en vhen she recallea soae ~artica­
larlT trau•atic e•ents. 
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~II!!! Li!! ~aatioa. Shirley and her husband, Bill, 
had been •arried for alaost two years. This was Shirley•s 
second •arriage and Bill's first. They had recently an!er-
gone sn~e serious crises. Bill bad just started bis tbira 
job in four yPars, as a lawyer in a larqe aanufactarinq con-
cern. Be ha~ lost his last job three aonths before because 
he vas "o•P.rly aabitioas." Shirley bad been •ery apset •hen 
Bill vas fired; she bad starte~ to won~~r if be would e•er 
straighten out and pro•ide for the faail•. Shirley clai•ed 
that fnr once she vould like to ba•e a aan who would take 
care of her. Although sbe bad ne•er been aware of wanting 
•uch in the way of aaterial possessions, recently she bad 
begun to ha•P. a•bition~ for a high~r stan1a~~ of liri.ng. 
For exaaple, she wanted to ao•e into a better neiqhborhood, 
vbere Saal, bP.r tvo-year old son, could ba•e •nicer 
friends." She found herself rP.stricting ~aul's playaates 
for •arioas reasons, but this pro"fed particularly apsetting 
since it repeated a pattern of her own cbildbo~. Shirley 
foun~ it •irtaally iaoossible to ask Bill for anythin9, and 
when she di~ brinq herself to ask for anything, eit~er for 
herself. Saul. or the •oase, abe becaae so guilty t~at occa-
sionally she er.aed up retuniing the ite• to tbe store. 
l!~1 fist2II• ShirleJ grew up in a lower-class nelgllbor-
h ood of a •edia•-size city. She was an only child, and her 
parent~ were econo•ically better off than tkeir eelq~bors. 
~er father •orked as a railroad e~qineer ana aade an a4e-
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quate lover-aid~le-class incoae. . Shirley's parents 
i•pressed upon her tb~t they regaraed theaselwes socially 
aboYe the rest of the eeiqhborllood, ana the! control tea her 
play~ates Yery riqialy. Thus, Shirley spent aany 4ays in an 
enforce~ isolation vhile the other children played on the 
streets. She describe~ her father as a •goo~ quy" who spent 
a gooa deal of tiae with her. BoveYer, be was also qaite 
strict and deaanaea a high standard of behawior fro1 her. 
Shirle! receiyed an occasional soankinq fro• her father, but 
on the whole be was oassiYe, and be left the actual aisci-
plining to his wife. Rer aother atte1ptea to control ber by 
constantly screaminq at her, vhich Shirley found intoler-
able. ShP. rP.coqnizea that her 
her welfare although the! founa 
paro.nts were. concerned with 
it cUff icult to 
affect ion ate. Shirley•s aother was preoccupied 
be ooenly 
with ill-
ness: ~he vouta beco1e "ill" vhenP.Yer the pressures of 
fa1ily life becaae too qreat. These illnesses, largely 
h'pocbondriacal, brought support an1 syapathy fro• both 
Shirle! ana her father, and.they were her aotber•s aost 
effectiwe •eans of controlling the faaily. Daring the 
oeriod~ of her aother•s •illnesses• it beca•e Shirley's aaty 
to take ower the responsibility of the boae. Ber aotber 
unabashealy critici~ea Sbirley•s perforaance. llthoagh 
often ~ry annoyed with her •other's illnesses, Shirley teot 
her irritation to herself, belieYing that t~ere was no 
alternative to this state of affairs. 
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Shirle1•s early physical and social ae•elop•ent vas 
essenti~ll! nor•al. Vben the restricti•enss of ber parents 
seriously li•ited her friendships, she •ade uo fantasy ,1ay-
•ates to while avay the ti•e. Jt the age of siK Shirley 
started in a gra~e school which was co•oosea of students 
fro• lower-class ho•es. Shirley regarded the other stuaents 
as •uch rougher than herself, and found •uch of their 
behavior difficult to reconcile vith the stanaards of con-
duct set in her ho•e. Dorin~ her school days, Shirley's 
oarents c~ntinue~ their oolicy nf keeping her apart fro• the 
"bad" children of her neighborhood. ~hough frustr!ted ana 
lon~ly, Shirley ne•er felt that it was a •atter which she 
could discuss vith her parents. 
~~ s~e approached po~erty, Shirlev•s father in particular 
tended to restrict her contact vith boys •ery •iqorously. 
Initially, as she enterP,d her teens, she vas not per•itted 
to as~ociate vitb bo•s or to be away fro• ho•e after dart. 
~here vere nu•erous indirect warnings about the dangers of 
sex, ~ut shP recei•ei little or no sex instruction. Shirley 
entered high s~hool at fourtee~ and foon~ herself at a loss 
in an essentially Up?er- ai~dle-class school. Ber clot•es 
ver~ inferior to thosP of the other children, and tbeir 
poise and snobbish ways •ade her feel extre•ely ancoafor-
tahle. ~t ~his ti•e, against her parents• wishes, she 
transferre~ to a Yocational school. where she felt aacb •ore 
at ease. Hove•er, the expressed antisocial behaTior of •anT 
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of the children shocked her. Soae of the hors alreadr bad 
police recor~s, an~ the girls were not ashaaei of recounting 
their serual adventures. It was at this tiae that Sbirter 
beqan to date. Rer father bitterly opoose3 this; it was 
only after a •iolent fight that peraission was qrante4 to be 
out until ten a~ night. During this perioa, Shirley aet 
Don, who was her age. One evening, after a few 4ates, Don 
induced b@r into having serual relations, asiag, as Shirley 
descrihe~ i+, •considerable force" to get bis way. However, 
Sbirler describei the experience in rather bland teras, su9-
ges~ing that she found the experience neither pleasurable 
nor unplPa~~~able. She also did not reae•ber exoeriencinq 
any guilt over this incid~nt, but she did have a fear of 
social disapproval shout~ the other tia~ fin~ out. Shirle' 
and Don continued to have seraal relations for tbe following 
tvo aonths, during which she suhaitted without pleasure t~ 
Don's deaands. Then Don becaae interested ia another 9irl 
and their relationship gradually dissolved. She re•eabers 
feeling relie•ed at the end of this affair. lfter t•e 
breat-uo vith Don, Shirle' continued to date boys, but sbe 
avoided intercourse. Sbe •a~ ieterestea in kissing aa4 pet• 
ting, but vas at a loss on hov to coaMunicate this to boys 
in a respectable fashion. She finallT hit on the solution 
of pretendinq to be asleep wben alone with a boy. During 
these periods she would perait tbe bOT to aate ad•ances, 
•a~ing up vben the advances went beyond •bat she 4eslred. 
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Confliet and discord within the bo•e re•ained intense 
during this period, and ShirleT often had to fight with ber 
fathPr in order to obtain per•ission to go oat oa a 4ate. 
'regaently she bad to endure physical panish•eDt fro• her 
father before ~e would relent and finally let her ~o. tt 
was daring this period that Shirley aet ll, a aan in 'is 
late twenties. Shirley vas sirteen at the ti•e and found ll 
quite attracti•e. After a brief courtship which in•olYe~ 
soae aborted sexual ezperiences, ll asked Shirley to aarry 
hia. -lthouq~ avare that she was not coaoletely in lo•e 
with Al, Shirley found his proposal desirable as it would 
get her out of her oppressi•e ho~e en•ironaent. They were 
•arried three aontbs later with ber parent's a~pro•al. 
ShirlPv described Al as a "nic~ gar" vho took care ~f her 
and vas kind of fatherly tov!rd her. At tbe beginning, sbe 
foun3 s~xual relations gratifTin~, bat qra~o!ll• she lost 
interest and beca•e frigid. In •any ways, Shirley's 
description of ll vas Yery Taque, and farther ••estioning 
produced little additional infor•ation. 
lfter ft fev •ontbs o! aarriaqe, Shirley found herself 
growing aore llstaat froa 11, and she beqan to loot aroand 
for other interests. She signe~ up for a course in •osic 
appreciation giYen by a local •aslcian of some repute. She 
foana herself •er, aueh attractea to the te~eher, 3aaes, and 
vit.hin a short ti•e theT vere in•ol•ea in an affair. lhen 
she vas eiqhteen ShirleT divorced her hasbana and went to 
104 
li•e with Ja•e~. To ~elp supple•ent the •ea9er inco•e Ja•es 
aeri•P.a fro• his •usic appreciation coarses. Shirley sac-
cessful ly operate~ a s•all record aad sheet •asic store. 
She found Jaaes was a •ery bohe•ian type who cared little 
for •aterial thinqs and qradaally left the financial support 
of the r~lationshiD up to Shirley. Shirley's relationship 
with Ja•es was a •ery te•pestuous one. In aadition to 
working infrequently. Ja•es conductea a nu•ber of aff!irs 
with other wo•~n, often flaantinq tbe• i~ front of Shirley. 
Shirley reported that she was je3lous to a •ild deqree. but 
also. she felt •ore desir~us of Ja•~s and •ore interested in 
hi• because o•her vomen vere. At ti•es. Shirle' thre!tene1 
to leaye JaaPs and be usually replied with an unconcerned 
"O~ ~oo1~v." When ~his hap~ened, Shirley beca•e terribly 
upset an3 she wnuld beg Ja•es to take her bact. Thr~aqhoat 
the affair, Shirley felt an intense sexual attraction for 
J~aes and not once aid she eKperience the loss of desire or 
the frigidity characteristic of the situation with ber first 
bu$h~n~. Jft•es constantly.eaphasized his inability to 
supnort her ana his lack of aesire to confor• to society 
wbene•er Shirley raise4 the lssae of •arrla9e. 
It vas during tbe affair vitb Ja•es that Shirley's fatber 
became seriously ill. She recei•ea a telegra• fro• a rela-
tiY@ asking h@r to return to her ho•e tovn; bat she 414 not 
want to qo because she was ha•i~q consiaerahte llfflealties 
vith Ja•es at that ti•e. Her father died shortly after-
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ward~, and Shirley felt intense quilt because she faitea to 
see her father before his death. Shortly after •er father 
died, Shirley's •other beca•e e•otionallf ill. Sbe was 
goinq through the •enopaase and deyeloped acate in•olational 
sy•ptoas. Shirley vent back to her bo•e t.own and foani it 
necessa~y to baYe her •other eoa•itted to. a stat~ hospital 
for treataent. lqain Shirley expP.rienced intense guilt 
feelinas about taking this action, particularly since she 
left her •other in the hospital shortlf after co••itaent in 
order to return to J~•es. Shirley's •other reaained ln the 
state hosoit~l for one year at which t.iae she vas discharge~ 
as i• proved. 
Daring the latter ohase of her affair with Jaaes, S~irley 
tried sP.Yeral tiaes to leaye hi•, bot eYentually realized 
that it vas iapossible. She was aaaze~ to see bow intensely 
she was boona to Ja~es. At ti•es, she felt that he coald do 
anything to ber, regardless of how crael or hu•iliating, and 
she voald endure it without coaplaint. lt one point, Jaaes 
erpressed a desire to haTe a ·child and shortly thereafter 
~hirley beca~e pregnant. Darinq this pregnancy, Shirley was 
oft.en ill, sufferinCJ fre(faent bouts of nausea and •eac!aetaes. 
James vorted •ery little and Shirley continued to work 
part-ti•P. in the afternoons. She often longed to stay llo•e 
in the aornings to r~st, bat Ja•es insistec! that she shoal~ 
get av~' from the house. Daring the pregnancT Shirley found 
it ~ssible to •ate so•e de•ands on Ja•es. one •ornlnq, 
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Shirlev and JaRes bad a particularly Yiolent arguaent in 
which Shirlev vas annoyed that Ja•es wouldn't help ber clean 
the house. ShP vas particularly deterained that Ja•e~ 
should clean the attic. Shortly after their arqaaent, when 
Shirlev qot into the car to leave for work, Ja•es kissed her 
goo~bv an~ said, •oon•t be an~ry vitb ae." When Sbirlev 
returned hoae she found Jaaes dead, hanqing fro• a rafter in 
an iaaacalately clean attic. ShirleT was shocked, bat 
recoverP.d in a fev boa~s without any •isible disruption in 
her behavior. She called the police, and aade arranqeaents 
for the funeral. Shirley was .ery surprised at her reaction 
to the whole affair. ~lthoagb she ba~ live~ with Jaaes for 
three years, she believes that she aost baYe been secretly 
relieYe~ that the relationship caae to an ena. She found 
~erself stranqely unable to cry or to ezperience any e•otion 
afte~ Ja•es•s death: however, at the funeral, she foand it 
necessary to feiqn a qrief reaction so that her friends 
woul~ not think ber peculiar. Shirley•s beba•ior after 
Jaaes•s death was so well controlle4 that •er friends con-
tinuously praised her •for carrying on without 9oinq to 
pieces." Shortly after the faneral, Shirley left tbe city 
to return to her hoae tovn, vhP.re she •o•e4 in with her 
a other. 
SiK aontbs later, s~ul was horn followinq a noraal ana 
P.asy deli•e~v. ~vo •nnths after Saul va~ born, S~irley vent 
to work as a secretary at the lar'9e factory where she aet 
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her present husband. Their courtship was a storay one bat 
they decided to qet •a~rie~ after six aonths of an oa•a9ain, 
off-again, enqageaent. ~ill seeaed to ta~e to 5a•1 •ery 
early in the relationsbio and was oleased "1th t•e taes of 
hawing a readf-aaae faaily. At the tiae treataent began the 
couple were trying to hawe a child of their own, but bad not 
succeeded. 
As vas custoaary in the 
clinic, Shirley was assigned to a clinical ~sycholoqist 
whose job it •as to aake a judgment about Sbirler•s e•o-
tional con~ition and to aake a treat•ent recoaaendation 
based on that judqaent. Dr. "· aet with Shirley wherein tbe 
preceding inforaation regarding her background, foraati•e 
experiences, and current coaplaints vas discussed. Dr. L 
judged Shirley's physical syaptoas, the headaches and atzzi• 
ness, to be caused bf eaotional issues. Like her aother, it 
seeaed that Shirley bad learned to ae•elop playslcal syaptoas 
as a response to eaotional probleas.Dr. !. recoaaenl!e4 tlaat 
·.· Sbirlef beqia weetlT outpatient psyclaotlaerapy l••e!iately ~o 
vork on her eaotional issues. 
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G!OBG! P. 
Clinical CasP. History 
109 
-
GeorgP P., a single, white •ale, aqe fifty, had reques•ed 
read~ission to a Teteran•s ~dministration general and sur-
gical hospital, "Because ay stoaacb bad been acting up 
again." On admission, George had qiYen a d~tailed descrip-
tion of hi~ comPlaint, using •any aedical ter•s vith vbich 
he had ~eco•e familiar in his preYioos hospitali7.ations. lt 
thi5 tiaP. his disability had beco.e so seYere that he had 
been unable to vork for the previous th~ee ~onths. ll•ost 
constantly daring his waking hours he vas aware of Pains in 
his sto•ach, a steadT •heartburn," and a generalize~ feeling 
of VP.akness and •alaise. He vas anable to eat any solid 
food co•fortably without fear of vomiting. ?or the Past 
several veet.s bP. bad lived chiefly on ski••e~ •ilk. Ouring 
this ti•e he had lost the fifteen-pound weight gain •hicb he 
had accumulated over the year since his last hospitaliza-
ti on. 
In appearance ftr. P was a slight-built aan, five feet, 
four inches tall, hollow-cheeked but bronze~ in coaplexioa. 
Re valked jauntily around th~ hospital, sst relaxea in a 
chair as he talked, ~nd see•ed in general gooa spirits; in 
fact, at first qlance, with the exception of his notable 
thinness of face, he aopeared to be in the best of health. 
Indeed, althooqh he said be was sollPvhat depressed bT having 
to return to the hosoital, he see•e~ aost cheerfal. He was 
quite frien~ly , alth~ugh be ad•itted that be didn't see any 
connection between his ohysical illnPss and an! possible 
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"nerYousness" and was •erely beinq co-operatiYe because his 
physician had reco•mende~ it. He himself felt sure that 
•ner•oasness" would be rule~ out as a cause of his illness 
and that he would be continued on a reqi•e of •edication. 
vith the possibility of surgery, as had been the case in his 
prerious contacts with the hos pi ta 1. 
Usually wearing a hosoital robe. e•en thou1h not confined 
to bed. be vas always neatly attired. His thinning, 5ark 
hair vas plastered down aaainst his stall and the nurses 
reporte~ that be spent a great deal of tiae in his ~ersonal 
care and qroo•inq. Vhen not wearing his hospital robe he 
dressed in his vorting khakis and sported a bright-colored 
necktie and highly polished shoes. 
This was the 
George. Re had 
sixth read•ission to this hospital for 
first been adaitted in 19~7 shortly after 
his discbarqe from the •ilitary ser•ice, •ith the saae coa-
plaint. He vas admittea the second ti•e ten years later ant1 
he had been readaitted annually since 1q~7 with the excep-
tion of one year. A stomach ulcer bad been disco•ered on 
his secon~ admission in 1957, and in 19S8 be bad a resection 
of the stomach vall. Since that ti•e he had been treatea by 
•arious •edications hut there had been no signs of an acti•e 
ulcer in the last several hospital aa•issions. 
At the time of this hospitalization George •as li•tng 
alone in a tinv one-roo9 apartment near thP hos~ital, as he 
had been since his •other's death in 195~. He had been 
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employed steadily for the past three years as a ser•iceaan 
for an automatic food aachine coanany, refilling the coffee 
and other food aachines in •arious busiftPss establishwents 
and institu~ions in the local region. George vent into 
detail in explaining bis 1ob and so•e of the difficulties 
involved. He had obtained the job throuJh a friend who 
owned the co•~any vhen it opened. He was thP coapany•s aost 
experienced worker, having outlaste~ all other •en vbo had 
worked for thea. In bis opinion, other •en quit becaase the 
vork was fairly de•anding, keeping a person on his feet all 
day long and on the ao•e, going fro• building to building. 
Rot only vas he responsible for seeing that the aachines 
were stocked but also that they vere in good repair; in 
addition he had to collect the recei~ts and •ake sure that 
the aachine vas full of chanqe. 
plaints of the castoaers and was 
broke dovn. Re was also charged 
Be bad to answer the co•-
on call whenever a •acbine 
with tryinq to sell the 
•achine service to nev fir•s tbrough~ut his area. His vork 
vas salaried, bot he aadP ertra coaaissions vbeneYer be sold 
the service to a new firm. He f oond the wort challenging, 
vas proud of his service, and had •ade •any friends by bis 
cheerful and co-operatiTP. manner. HP. claimed that bis cus-
tomers vere. all very fond of him, called hi• by his first 
naae, and looked forward to hi~ •isits. He boasted that he 
had ~xpanded the fira•s business in his area soae ten ti•es 
in bis ~eriod of e~nloyment by ~h~ coapany. Accordin~ to 
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George his ;oh occupied apnroxi•ately ten boors a day, but 
he didn't •ind because he h~d very little else to do and the 
1ob afforded hi• a qreat deal of social contact, which be 
lacked elsewhere. However, shortly after be joined the coa-
pany bis friend vas stricken vith a heart attack and a young 
relative of the friend took over the coapany. He felt that 
thi~ new e•ployer vas letting the husiness deteriorate 
through disinterest and that Georqe•s ovn efforts to build 
up the hosiness in his particular area were unappreciated. 
lt ti•es George felt that his nev young eaployer actually 
did not want to see the business eipanded and interfered 
with some of George's efforts to see nev business built up. 
During George's previous periods of illness his eaployer bad 
been aost onderstandina and had not docked his pay although 
there was no definite sick leave provision on his job. 
However, during the ~ast year George's e•ployer was auch 
less syapathetic vith his occasional illness. George felt 
he had to struggle even harder to be there every lay as 
there vas not a replacement for him and his custoaers were 
becoming dissatisfied. Thus be often vent to wort when he 
was feeling quite ill and straggle~ through the da!. Re 
f ouna the lifting of heavy boxes of supplies and the poshing 
around of large food-Yending aachines becoainq al•ost iapos-
sible. He finally asked for a tvo-veek •ac~tion, which he 
bad coaing to hi• but which ordinarily he would have ta~en 
in aidsuaaer rather than at this tiae, just after Christ•!s. 
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Ris eaployP.r refuse~ bi• the Yacation, vbereooon George sua-
denly resigne~ in a fit of anger. Por the following siz 
WP.eks' oar period he stayed bome, liYing at first on bis 
severance pay and thPn on unemployaent insur~nce. The week 
before his unemploymP.nt insurance ran out George applied for 
adaission to the hospital. 
!!§! Bist2rI• GP.orqe V!S the fourth of fi•e children 
born in a s•all, "idwestern town to a •eterinarian and his 
schoolteacher wife. His older brother and tvo sisters were 
respecti•ely fifteen. tvel•e. and ten years older than hi•-
self, and his younger brother vas one ,ear his junior. 
George spoke in gloving teras of his father. Re initially 
described hi• a~ a •ery ~indly man whoa e•eryone loyed and 
admired. His extensi•e Yeterinarian practi•e left hi• 
little tiae for his faaily. ls a aart of his father's 
prowess. George told bov his father bad bee• one of the 
first to utilize artifical inseaination with cattle and was 
in George's words "the father of 5000 cows in southern 
Ohio." George claiaed that "kindness and service to others" 
vas the principle of his ovn lif~. which be had learned fro• 
watching his fath@r•s work with aniaals. Be described his 
fath~r as a sil~nt person vho, in his firm and yet tindly 
manner, was able to subdue and vin o•er the aost recslcit-
rant or •icious anim~l. He remarked that his father vrob-
ably regarded animals as aore intelligent and as hari.ng aore 
feeling than people, an1 in~icatea indirectly that his 
father vas fairly imoatient with human stupidity. 
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Another "•irtue" that Georqe clai•ed to ~a•e learned in 
'is childhood was "hard work." Prom school age on he •~s 
responsible for aany of the chores around their saall fara, 
particularlT as both his parP.nts were eaployed and his olde~ 
brothers and sisters were alreadf grown and bad left the 
fa•ily. George denied that be resented haying to spend aost 
of his after-~chool hours at these chorPs, safinq he often 
wished be were back on the farm. He spoke with considerable 
nostalgia of bis childhood years, particularlf of the 
rewards of outdoor life and of "good, fresh far• food." Re 
emphasized that although his •other taught school, she was 
always at ho•e to ta~e care of the house an~ to prowide gen-
erous •eals for the faE.ly and to entertain aanf friends. 
He spoke longingly of bo•e•a~e butt.er, port chops for break-
fast, and his •other's baked goods. Re learne~ to cook froa 
his wot her and enjoyed. llelping her around the kitchen. He 
•olunteered that despite all of this good, rich foo~ be 
ne•er gained any weight and was always of slight build, and 
wiry. His lean build concerned bis aotber a great deal ana 
she was always anxious to fatten hi• up. Bowe•er, he said, 
be was built auch lite his father and uo until the tiae of 
his illness had alvafs been able to eat e•erytbinq and any-
thing without fear of beco•ing o•erweiqht. 
George was a slight.ly abowe-a •eraqe student throuJhout 
bis priaary-school years, when be vas const~ntlT coached by 
his •other. Re ad•itted readily that this coaching bT bis 
schoolteacher-aother vas a point of 
although he quickly added that this 
irritation 
was the only 
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to bi•• 
thing he 
could think of about which he had actually been at oc!ds vith 
her. Apparently he was able to conYince his •other when he 
began hiqh school that he should be free of her teachings. 
bat be was aach less successful a s~adent in hiqh school. 
where he was wuch aore interested in sports. Despite his 
size he had been an actiYe athlete. was always on the base-
ball tea•, and eyen played basketball until be reached an 
aqe vben he di~ not ha•e the required beight. Re had aany 
companions and despite his boae duties and extra studies be 
bad plentr of ti•e to play and to get into aiscbief. Be 
adaitte~ with a laugh that be often eabarassed his parents 
by his aischieToos and somewhat destractiYe acts - which be 
thought all young boys did. Occasionally. his aischief 
brought hi• to the attention of the town constable. who took 
a special delight in hunting hi• down because ~e was the 
schoolteacher's son. His parents atteaptei to disci~li•e 
him, chiefly by adding to his chores ana atteapting to 
restrict hi• to the confines of the fa•ilJ property. 
Occasionally his father adainistered the traditional cor-
poral punisb•ent in the woodshed. He described hiaself as 
being " a young rehel" during his teen-age years. who •ga•e 
the teachers a bad time at school." lpproEiaately three 
•onths prior to the tiae he woul~ haTP. been qra4uated fro• 
high school he was called to the principal•s office for 
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infraction of one of the school rules, at which tiae, in a 
~eak of anger, he threw his loc~er ke• on the priRci~al's 
desk and demande~ his tventy-fiYe cents• deposit as an 
indication that he vas quittinq school. When be announced 
this d~cision later that ev~ninq to his parents, his 
father's response was that if be vere old enouqh to aake 
such a decision he v~s old enough to earn bis own li•ing and 
fro• there on his father would require room and board aoney 
fro• hi•. 
George decided anqrily to leaYe home. After a tearful 
scene with his mother be packed hi• baqs and toot the next 
freiqht train out of tovn. This vas the first year of the 
depression of the 19JO•s and George found it difficult to 
find peraanent e•ploye•ent anJYhere. He roamed bact and 
forth across the United States, often livinq in hobo 1un-
qles, picking ap work where he could or living teaporarily 
of! of various kinds of relief fro• government agencies. 
Despite the many deprivations which he endured then, George 
tal~ed about this period of his life as if it were actually 
enjoyable. When unP.mployed, he would 90 sightseeing, talt 
to people fro• every valk of life, and live a life of qen-
eral freedom eyen though he ao lonq~r enjo1ea the relative 
luxury he had been used to in his childhood. So•~ three 
years later, when he was approxiRately twenty-one, he 
returned home for a brief visit to find his father on the 
verge of death. His father had suffered from an undiaqnosed 
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stomach problea. So•~ months before George's return home 
the elder ~r. P had been told be had sto•ach cancer. where-
upon he suddenly dronpe1 his entire ~ractice and sat around 
ho•e in what •ust have been a deep depression. George vas-
shocked to find his father so depressed and arqed bi• to 
seek •edical care. but the father ada~antly refused, saying 
that he did not trust doctors. ~inally the faaily almost 
forced the elder "r- P. into the hospital. where o•er his 
protests he underwent surgery. Shortl' thereafter George's 
father died from pnea•onia. 
After the death of his father, ~eorg~ atteanted to 
operate the family far• for a short period. Ris older 
siblings vere •arried and had families o! their ovn and 
could not, at that point. contribute to his aotber•s sup-
por~ Ris younqer brother had qone on to college and was 
beginning a career in the theater in lev tort. After 
approzi•ately a year, George con•inced bis •other to sell 
the fa•ilv property. Then they aoved to Soathern 
California, vbere George had spent so•P time during his 
tra•els around the country. Until World lar II, ~eorqe 
earned his livinq at •arious odd jobs. chiefly as a short-
order cook and baker. He vas drafted into the na•y in 19-2 
and served for four years as a cook and baker. Re vas 
aboard ship a qreat deal of the ti•e but sav ao coabat other 
th~n the constant strain of possible subaarine warfare or 
occasional threat of air attack. Re clai•s to have been 
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deafened at one ti•e bf gunnery practice ani was 9i•en a 10 
per cent disability for hP.arinq loss. lfter bis discharge 
fro~ the ser•ice in ,9•6, be returne1 aqain to li•e with his 
•other. Using some of tbe yeteran•s benefits, he borrowed 
•oney and went into the restaurant business. Re operated two 
different restaurants and ~ars o•er the nert fiTe years, 
both of vhich failed. Re erolain~d that he had •isfortune 
in the first such Tentur~ when the partner ran off with the 
funds. !n the second •enture, he foresaw the approachin~ 
depression of the •i~ 1950's and sold out because be vas 
afraid of losing fonds which he had borrowed fro• his 
aother. Although ~eorge neTer mentioned his inheritance 
directlr, it ap~eared that his father's estate had been left 
under the control of his •other, vho bought a hoae and was 
able to li•e on the incoae from investaents whether or not 
George hiaself brought in any incoae. 
George described his twenty years of li•inq with bis 
aotber as alaost idyllic. •she was •Y buddy.• Be spent all 
bis s~are tiae sure that she vas co~fortable, that she got 
where she vanted to qo. an~ that she had all the co•forts of 
hoae. Re describE"d in <1etail the flower and •eqetable 
garden that he worked on Jear after ,ear for her satisfac-
tion. Re vas an ayid fisher•an and outdoor sports•an ant! be 
alvays toot his aother along. Be bad a special •caaper" 
built for her co•fort and alvays.broaqht back his fishing 
catch for her appro•al. 
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Despite his portrayal of hi•self as a qood boy de•oted to 
kis mother, George gave •any hints that his adult social 
adjustaent was at times aarginal. Re adaitted that he was 
in frequent trouble vitb the law because of bis dri•ing 
babits. He bad nuaerous tickets for speeding, for dri•ing 
under tbe influence of alcohol, and later, vhen his license 
was taken avay, for driving without a license. Re be•oaned 
the rising costs of fines for bis illegal driving practices. 
lltboagh he said that he had lost his business because of 
the depression, VA records indicat~d that he also had been 
in trouble for sellin~ liquor to a •inor. Be later ad•itted 
that his husiness partner was a qa•bler an~ that be biaself 
bad tried to •ake money throaqb qa•bling at Tarious ti•es. 
When asked about his use of alcohol, George becaae 
tiqht-liooe~ an1 so•evhat irritated, saying that he bad 
better adait that he dran~ at least a six-pack of beer a day 
because this vas already in his record. He ezplained that 
be had been in an altercation with a night nurse just the 
pre•ious e•ening becsuse she had suggested that be aiqbt qo 
to an alcoholics lnony•ous aeetinq; he felt that it was 
unfair that he haa any reputation as an alcoholic. on the 
other band, in discussinq bis •other, he ad•itted that the 
one thing she would ne•e~ do was ot:Jen a can of beer for hi•. 
He strongly denied that he drank anything s~ronqer than 
beer, but then ad~ea vith a s•ile that this was because he 
coutan•t afford it. 
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Jn discussing his fa~ily, Georqe r~pe~tedly •en+ioned tbe 
successes of his young~r brother David. Re described how 
his brother had beco,e a •ajor theatrical ~rodacer, •ith 
frequent plays on Broad•a! and productions in Los Angeles, 
and •ore recently in Las Vegas. Re remarked how extre•ely 
proud his •other was of David an~ bov DaYid would send her 
theater tickets an~ a plane tictet to go to the openinq 
nights of his new productions. George ad•itted that be hi•-
self had seen only one or two of David's plays. Re ad•itted 
with a wink that vhen his aother was away fro• hoae he vas 
able to qet in a little extra fishing or clrinting which she 
aiqht otherwise not approYed of. He also descrihed Dari.d's 
sqccess as particularl, a•azing because, "frankly, David vas 
a sniYeling lit~le brat" as a child, who• no one presuaed 
would eyer a•ount to anythinq. As he looke~ back on it, 
George reaeabered ~hat when they were children David spent 
•ost of his tiae vith books instead of sharing tbe far• 
chores vitb George. 
Asked why he had neyer aarried, George lauqhed and said 
he had always asked that question. He decided that. he had 
been left with the responsibility for his •other and that 
life had been so ~asy an~ wonderful with her that be ba~ 
neYer gotten around to hunting for a vife. Be went on to 
reflect that he bad been so interested in s~rts as a voang-
ster in hiqh school that he did Yery little dating. Re bad 
had on~ girl be was Tery fond of, but always had to struqqle 
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•itb several other rivals. He recalled an incident in vhich 
be had lost his te•per and beaten op a rival for this girl, 
and subsequently the girl's father had f~rhi~den hi• to coae 
around the house because of this. The girl •~rrie1 another 
aan and •any years later Geor~e heard th~t her hashand had 
die~: On hearing this. be aade a trip back to bis hoae town 
to visit ber. Re described her vith considerable disgust, 
saying that she baa grown obese and sloopy and "was wearinq 
nothino bat a thin 3ress." lsked aore about his sexual 
adjust•ent. Georqe shrugged an1 said that he guessed he vas 
about noraal for a bachelor. erplaining tkat he visite~ 
houses of prosl:itation once or t.vice a year "to qet it out 
of his srstea." 
George's •other died in 1956. llthoo~h he was able to 
discuss the detail~ of her death and his feelings about it 
in the saae garrulous fashion he had discussed other facets 
of his life,there vas a noticeable lovering and depression 
in bis voice and his e,es seeaed near to tears osee or 
twice. He overtly denied being deoressea. saring that it 
was fortunate that. she ~ad lingered on for a long period 
because he had that way been able to get used to the idea 
that she vas qoing to die. He exolaiaed that she had been 
an ertremely active and independent person until the tiae of 
acci~ent which led to her death. even thoog' she was 
approaching eighty. She had been ~hopping by herself. bad 
slippe~, fallen. and broken her hip. She •as hospitalized 
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for •any aonths an~ returned hoae. where he bad to nurse 
her. Shortly thereafter she suffered an eabolisa which left 
her paralyzed and necessitated putting her in a narsinq 
boae. Bis •other continuer} to •fight off death• for another 
six aonths vhile she lay paralTzed and al•ost unconscious. 
George had quit his job as a cook at the ti•e of ber injury 
and bad stayed at ho•e c~ring for ber. li•ing off the inco•e 
of so•P. of her in•estaents. Por the follovinq year he con-
tinuP.d to be unemployed. After his second hospitalization 
in 1q57 for his stoaach complaint. he went back to work as a 
baker. After his 1958 operation he obtaiDP.d his oresent 
job. 
Zt!at•ent •eco••enaatio!. George's current physical 
ezaaination and laboratory reports shoved that althoaqh he 
had soae hyoeracidity in his digesti•e systea. Georqe vas 
not in any physical danger nor did be ha•e anf ~hysically 
disabling 0 roble•s. 
George was referred to a clinical psychologist whose job 
it was to •ake a judge•ent about Geor9e•s e•otional condi-
tion and to aake a treat•ent reco•aendation based on th~t 
jucJg•ent. Dr. Pl. •et vith Georqe whP.rein the prece~ing 
inforaation reqarding bis background. for•atiTe experiences, 
and current coaplaints was discussed. It was or. Pl.'s jud~­
•ent that. as long as Georqe no long~r needed aedical atten-
tion. he should be discharged fr?~ the hospital. Dr. ~. 
thought that George's reoeated hospitalizations reflected 
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his desire to be sheltered from the adult world. Although George 
still sought refuge in the hospital, Dr. M. felt that George was 
emotionally capable of leaving the hospital and beginning to live on 
his own at this time. Dr. M. recommended that George see a vocational 
counselor to be placed innnediately in a suitable job. Dr. M. also 
recommended that George begin weekly outpatient counseling to help 
George adjust to leaving the hospital and functioning in society. 
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THE!! All 10 RIGHT 01 W!OIG AISW!IS TO Alf OP TR!S! O.~!ST!OWS. 
9! AR! IIT!B!ST!D II YOUB OPIIIOIS R!GlRDIIG TRIS ClS!. 
FOB QU!S'!'IOIS 1-5. PLEAS! CTRCL! 01'! IU~~!! B!~W!!I , sni 6. 
1. ~ased on this c~~e. hov vnul~ yoa r~te the ~aality of nr. •.•s 
overa 11 clinical 1udq•en~? 
T!R! 
POOR 
.JUDG"!IT 
1 
POOB 
JUDG!!IT 
2 
SLIGHTLY 
POOR 
JUDG!!I'!' 
St.!GR'!'LY 
GOnD 
JUDG!l!I'!' 
" 
GO'lD 
JUT>G!l!llT 
nPY 
GOOO 
JDDG .. !IT 
6 
2. "lorP soecificallT, hov vould TOU rat.en!'. 111.•s ;u]q112n+ that 
Shirley's ohysical sy•ptoms were c~used h! P~otio~~l i~snP~? 
Y!RY 
POOR 
JUDGPl!IT 
1 
POOR 
JU1>G"!IT 
2 
SLIGHTLY 
POOR 
JUDG "!ft 
3 
SLIGHTLY 
GOOD 
J8DG .. l1'T 
" 
T!l'Y 
GOOlt 
J"DG-.•IT 
3. Rov woulil you r~tc- "r. "'· • s tr~t•ent re::o••en~ati:>n, 
soecificallv that Shirley begin WPeklv outoatiPnt osvchothPraov 
to vor~ on her e•otional issues? 
'EBY 
POOB 
, 
POOB 
2 
SLIGHTLY 
POOB 
3 
SLYGRTLY 
GOOD 
• 
GOOD 
T!PT 
GOOD 
~~ Assuap that Shirley follows or. "'·'s tre,t•ent r~co••en~ation sn~ 
she recovers. Row ~ucb credi~ •~uld you ~av Shirlev aP.servP~ for he~ 
recovPrv? 
WOii! 
or '!'BE 
Cl!DIT 
, 
l LT,.TL! 
or TR! 
Cl!DI'!' 
2 
SO"! 
or Te 
CB!DI'!' 
3 
RUCH 
01' THE 
Cl!DIT 
'IOS'!' 
01' ,.R! 
Ctt!D!~ 
lLL 
OP TllP 
Cl!DIT 
6 
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4B. AssuaP that ShirlPv follows ~r. "'·'s •re!••ent re=~••en1a•i:>n !~1 
she recovPrs. Row •uch credit •ould TOU sa! Or. "· aeserves for 
Shirley's rP.covery? 
IOI! 
OP TB! 
CB!DIT 
, 
l LYTTLE 
or TB! 
CR!Dt'!' 
2 
SOB! 
Ol' TR! 
CHDIT 
3 
llUCR 
01' TR~ 
Cl!DI'l' 
' 
!IOST 
or TR! 
Cl!JDTT 
ILL 
OP '!'ft! 
C'lt ! ,, !'!' 
fi 
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~c. assume that ~hirlev follnvs nr. ~.•s tre~t•eRt rP=o••end!ti~n •~~ 
she re~oTers. lssu•e that 100• of the cre~it •ust be asslone~ to 
Shirley, ~r. ~ •• or s~•e coahination o~ the tvo. ~se oercen+~qe$ 
below to assign credit for ShirlPT's recoTer~. 
WOT! TRlT TB! P!trC!WTlG!S IUST so~ TO 100,. 
Shirley aeseryes I of the total credit. 
Dr. R. 4eserTes I of t•e total credit. 
TO~lt 100 I 
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-
she suffers CPrtain conseauences fo~ not seP~ini ae~ic•l •tte~tio~ 
riqht avay for hPr p~ysic~l ST•pto•s. Rov auc~ hla•e vnutd Shirle'f 
deser'fe for those con!;eauences? 
IOI! 1 LITTL! "OCH ROS'r lLL 
or TBE O'P' TB"- OP TB'! OP TR! OP !'RE 
BLl"E BUR! BLlft! Btlllll! BU"! 
, 2 • 6 
5~. -ssu•e that Shirley fnllovs ~r. 111.•s tre•t•ent rec~••eniatinn •n, 
she suffers certain consequences for not seekinq 9P~ic•l ~ttention 
riqht avay for her Ph•sical symotoms. Rov •u~h bla•e would nr. • 
deser•e for those consequences? 
101'! A LITTL! SOit! "OCH "OST ILL 
OP TH! or TB! OP TB! OP TB! 01' T!I! 
ILlR! BLlRE BLUI! BL11!1' BtAlllP. BLAR! 
1 2 3 
' 
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SC. ~ssuae that ~hirley follow~ Or. "·'s •re~tment rPco~"Pnda•i~n \~' 
she suffer~ certain conseauences for not seekinq •P~ietl sttenti~n 
right aw-!y for her physiC'll symptoms. A~su~e th!t ,,,,,, of the 
blamP •ust be as~igned tn ~hirley, ~r. ~ •• or so~P co•~in9tion o~ •h~ 
tvo. Ose percentaqPs ~elov to as~iqn bl\•e fnr tbns?. e~nsequence~ f~r 
Shirley. 
ROTE TBIT THE PntCERTAGES RUST SU" ~O 100l. 
~ of tbe total bla•e. 
Dr. "· deser•es ' of the total bls•e. 
TOTAL 100 ~ 
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ISSUft! TRlT YOU 11! I CLIIICIL PSYCHOLOGIST 110 TRI~ S~I,LWT WE•! TO 
SI! !OU IIST!ID OP DI. R. 1551"1! T111T YOU JUS~ roRPL!T!f) TB~ 
IIT!ITill •ITR SRIIL!Y WR!R!II IIPOIRITIOI l80UT RIP 81C~G90UID• 
POlftlTIT! !IPllI!IC!S. llD CUllllT CORPtlTITS WIS DISC~SS!D. 
leaember tha~ you 1ust •e~ with Sbirle•. 
7. Use ~ercentagPs to describe vh!t vou sPe !S thP ch~r~P~ th~• 
ShirlPy's ph,sical s'•~to•s ar@ or ~re not c~use~ ~y e•otion!l issu~~. 
IOTE TRIT TR! P!IC!ITIG!S RUST SUft TO 100J. 
T•e chances that Shirley•s physical 
syaptoas ll! caased by e•otional iSS11es are: 
The chances that Shirley's physical 
syaptoas ll! IOT caused by e•otional issaes are:~ I 
TOTAL ,00 ~ 
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B. use percentages to describe vhat •ou see as thP chance~ tha• 
weekly psychotherapy is the appropriate trPat•Pnt re~o••en1~+ion for 
Shirley. 
IOT! TBlT TB! P!ltCllTlG!S RUST SUft 'TO 100~. 
Re•emb~r th~t you 1ust •et with ~hirley. 
The chances that weekly outpatient psrchothera~y 
IS appropriate treat•ent for Shirley are: 
T~ c•ances that weekly outpatient psyc•ot•era~y 
IS IOT appropriate treataent for Shirley are: I 
TOTAL 100 I 
9. Toq have ju~t co~PletPd thP i~terview wit~ ~hirlev !n~ arP 
considering various trea••Pn• options. Yoq arP c~nsi~~ri~q, !S 
Dr. ~- did, the possi~ility of rP.co••ending that ~hir1PV tPgin 
WP.P.klv outPatient PS!ChotheraPV i••eiia•ely to ~eal with thP 
e•otional causes of her svmptows.!f fOU decide to wake t~is 
reco••en~atior, what do you think th~ ch~nces are that the 
following scerario will occur? PL!~S~ CTPCL~ n~, OF ~Rv 
P!RCFN!~G·~ ON ~µ! sr~L· ~!tnv. 
~irlef will learn in therapy to talk •ore openly aboat her 
feelinqs about past and current relatiODships. Is she 
proqresses in therapy, her pbfsical sy•pto•s will disappe!r 
and her relationships with her •usband aad son will i•pro•e. 
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10 C1111cz or 
OCCORRIMG 
CWRTlII DP 
O~~URR!W~ 
Ol 101 20l 301 501 601 70~ 801 
10. Tou ar~ still considering, as n~. ~. did, the oo~Rihilitv o~ 
reco•mendinq that 5hir1Py begin weekly outpatient psychother•nv 
i•me~iately tn ~eal with the e•otional caa~e~ of her symnto•~. 
If you decide to •ake this reco••en~ation, what do you thin~ the 
chances are thlt the following scenario •ill ocear? ~t~~~, ~T-~t• 
ONE or TR~ PERC1NT~~,5 ON ~Rf SC~L! B!tnw. 
Before beqinniaq therapy, Shirley's physical sr•,to•s 
will worsen. Shirley will aee a p•ysician and atsc~~r 
that her physical sy•pto•s are caasea by a ~hysical eoa4ltioa. 
•o CBlWC! or 
OCCURRIWG 
01 101 201 301 501 601 701 801 901 
~W~l!I OP 
O~~~WWTI~ 
1001 
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11. ~ov you •ust eyaluate the ch!nces t~•t !T•~!~ scP."•rlo ,, 
OR ~cenario 12 vill occur. TOUR nl'RC!~~~r.r.s ~~~! so~ ·~ 10~~-
Sllirley •ill learn ill tlterapy to talt ao~ ope11lT aboat Iler 
feelings about past and current relatloasbi ps. Is site 
progresses in therapy, ber P'yslcal syaptoas •ill disappear 
and ber relationships vitb ber ltasbaad and son will i•~ro•e. 
Before beginning tlterapy, S~rley•s pltysical syaptoas 
will worsen. SltirleT •ill see a pltysician and disco~r 
tbat her physical syaptoas are caased by a playsieal condition. 
TR! ClllCBS OP SC!WIRtO 11 OCC91111G II!: 
' 
Tl! ClllCBS OP SC!llPIO 12 OCCUllRIIG II!: I 
-----
'!'OTIL 100 W 
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12. Listed below is ~r. ~.•s treataent recoaaen~ation follove1 h• 
othPr Dossit>le trea+•ent recoaaendatiof!s for Shit'le... Jls!';a•e +hat 
you are the clinical ?s .. choloqist who inter•ievP"I Shirle•. ~le~se 
ran~ all the follovino treataent recowaendatior.s fro': 
1•ft0ST PR!P!RR!D R~ft!!WDlTIOW to Sst!lST Pl!P!l!!D l!CG~!llDl'!'tOI. 
,.ote that you arf' ranking each reco11aPn"lation !"" 1111kP s'lrP th11+ t>ach 
recomaen~ation qPts a nuaher from 1-~ an"I no tvo rer.omaen~ation~ ae~ 
tbe sa•P nuaber. 
Be sare to read the reco••enaations carefall• so that •o• can 
distinguish between the•. 
ld•isP Shirley +o be1in VePkl• o!':•chotheraov an1 se!:' " 
phvsici'ln if her ph•sical prohlews continue. 
Jlrranqe for aore inforaation PRO~ Shirle• bef,r~ •akinq 
a definiti•e reco11•endation. 
fteet with o•her orofessionals to di!=:=uss the ca~e before 
•akinq a definitiTP reco••endatior.. 
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1~. Please assign a nu•her fro• the scale helov +o each ite•. 
DISlGI!! 
STIOIGLY 
DISlG!Jf! 
SLIGHTLY 
lGHE 
SLYGR'fLY lGl1"!! 
ST!tOWGLY 
lGP!! 
, 2 3 • 5 
~hirlev represente~ a difficult ease for anT elinie'll 
psychologist. 
'l't>ere ns not enough infor•'I t.ion ahoot SbirleT for !'r. •. 
to •11li:f' an appropriate reco•9endation. 
!'r. ~ should ha•e discus~e~ the case vitb othe~ 
professionals. 
nr. ~. •ade an appronriate reeoa•endation. 
No •P!tter vhat, Shirley's phfsical ~y~nto•s sh~ul~ haYP be~n 
ehected out hy a phTsician. 
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1q. To achieYP the 'oll puroo~Ps of thi~ ewoerimPnt, oPO"le were 
assign different kinds of clinical cases. Ple!se check the ~in1 
of clinical case that you read. 
A clinical ca~e in which the treat•ent reco•aen~'tion 
turned out to he yerT appropriate for the patient. 
A clinical case in which the treat•ent reco•Men1ation 
turne~ out to he MO~ •ery appropri~te 'or the oatie~t. 
A clinical case in which there was n~ in!or•!tinn about 
vhat baooened to the oatient after hein~ qi•er. ! treatmert 
reco••endation. 
TBllK IOU POI TODR COOP!llTIOW 
138 
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THE QUESTIOllAIIE 
George Subjects 
TBEBE lBE 10 RIGHT OR IBOIG llSVEBS TO llY OP TB!S! QD!STIOIS. 
IE lR! IITEB!STED II IOUB OPillOIS REGlBDllG TBIS ClS!. 
POR QUESTIOIS 1-5, PL!lS! CIBCL! 01! IOBB!I B!TIBEI 1 and 6. 
1. Based on this case, hov vould you rate the quality of Dr. ft. 1 s 
overall clinical judgment? 
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Y!BI 
POOR 
JUDGft!HT 
SLIGHTLY 
POOB 
JUDG!EIT 
SLIGHTLY 
GOOD 
JDDG!!IT 
GOOD 
.JODGBEIT 
HIT 
GOOD 
JDDGll!IT 
1 2 3 5 6 
2. ~ore specifically, hov vould you rate Dr. ft.• s judgment that 
George vas emotionally capable of leaving the hospital? 
YER! SLIGHTLY SLIGHTLY YEii 
POOB POOi POOR GOOD GOOD GOOD 
JODG!!RT JODG!!llT .JUDGB!WT JODG!EH JODG!EIT .JUDGIBIT 
1 2 3 fl 5 6 
3. Row would you rate Dr. "·'s treat•ent reco••endation, 
specifically that George be discharged fro• the hospital, tbat he 
see a Yocational counselor to be placed in a suitable job and t~at 
he begin weekly outpatient counseling to help with the adjust•ent. 
l!BY 
POOR 
JODG!l!T 
POOR 
.JUDG"!IT 
2 
SLIGHTLY 
POOR 
.JUDGHIT 
3 
SLIGHTLY 
GOOD 
.JUDG!!IT 
GOOD 
.JUDGllHT 
5 
Hit 
GOOD 
.JUDGll!ft 
6 
QA. Assu•e that George follows Dr. ft.'s treat•ent reco••endation and 
be recoyers. How •uch credit would you say George deseryes for his 
recovery? 
1011! 
or THE 
CREDIT 
l LITTLE 
OP THE 
CB!DIT 
2 
SOii! 
or THE 
CREDIT 
3 
RUCH 
OP TBE 
CIEDIT 
II 
llOST 
OP THE 
Cl!DI~ 
s 
lLL 
or '!'BE 
Cl!DIT 
6 
~B. Assu•e that George follows Dr. "·'s treat•ent reco••endation 
and he recovers. How •ucb credit would you say Dr. "· deserves for 
George's recovery? 
IOllE 
or TBE 
Cl!DIT 
l LI'l'TLE 
01 '!'BE 
Cl!DI'l' 
2 
SORE 
or THE 
CllDIT 
3 
llUCB 
or THE 
CIEDI'!' 
II 
llOST 
or THE 
CllDIT 
s 
lLL 
or TB! 
CHDIT 
6 
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~c. Assuae that George follows Dr. "·•s treataent reco••endation and 
be recoYers. Assu•e that 1001 of the credit •ust be assigned to 
George, Dr. "·• or some co•bination of the tvo. Use percentages below 
to assign credit for George's recowery. 
IOT! TBlT TB! PBBC!RTlG!S IDST SO! TO 1001. 
George deserYes I of t~e total credit. 
Dr. !. deserwes I of the total credit. 
TOTlL 100 I 
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ijC. Assume that George follows Dr. ft.•s treatment recomaendation and 
he recovers. Assume that 1001 of the credit aust be assigned to 
George, Dr. ft., or some coabination of the tvo. Use percentages below 
to assign credit for George's recovery. 
IOTE TBlT TBE PBBC!ITlG!S BOST SOB TO 1001. 
George deserwes ~ I of ~e total credit. 
Dr. ft. deserves ~ I of the total credit. 
TOTlL 100 I 
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5A. Assume that George follows Dr. Pl.'s treatment recommendation and 
he suffers certain consequences for not receiving inpatient 
psychiatric care right avay. Hov •uch bla•e would George deserwe 
for tlose consequences? 
IOIE 
OF THE 
BLlllE 
l LITTLE 
OF THE 
BLUIE 
2 
SORE 
OF THE 
BLlllE 
3 
BUCH 
OF TBE 
BLl" E 
4 
llOST 
or TBE 
BLll!! 
5 
lLL 
or TBE 
BLlll! 
f.i 
SB. Assume that George follows Dr. ~-'s treatment reco••endation and 
he suffers certain consequences for not receiving inpatient 
psychiatric care right away. Row much blame would Dr. II. deserve 
for those consequences? 
IOI! 
or THE 
BLl!E 
l LITTLE 
01' THE 
BLll'I E 
2 
SO!IE 
01' TB! 
_ BLll!E 
3 
llUCB 
OF 'l'BE 
BLll'I E 
4 
llOST 
or THE 
BLlllE 
5 
lLL 
OP 'l'BE 
BLUE 
6 
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Sc. Assume that George follows Dr. M.'s treatment reco••endation and 
he suffers certain consequences for not receiTing inpatient psyciatric 
care right away. Assu•e that 100~ of the blame •ust be assigned to 
George, Dr. M., or so•e co•bination of tbe two. Use percentages below 
to assign bla•e for those consequences for George. 
IOTE THAT TB! PERC!llTAG!S !DST SUR TO 1001. 
George deserwes I of t~e total bla•e. 
Dr. ft. deserwes ~~- I of tile total blaae. 
TOTAL 100 I 
lSSIRIE THAT YOU lRE 1 CLIIIClL PSYCHOLOGIST llD CBOBGI WBIT TO ~II 
YOU IISTElD OP DB. fl. lSSU!E TBlT YOU JOST CO!PL!TED TB! IITBIYISW 
WITH GEORGE IHEBEII IIFOB!lTIOI &BOUT BIS BlCIGBOUID. POIBITIT! 
EIPEBIEICES. lHD COBB!IT CO!PLlIITS WlS DISCUSSED. 
Re•ember that you just •et with George. 
7. Use percentages to describe vhat you see as the chances that 
George is emotionally capable of leaving the hospital. 
IOTE TBlT THE PEBC!ITlGES !UST SO! TO 1001. 
The chances that Ceorge IS e•otionally 
capable of leawing the hospital are: 
The chances that George IS IOT e•otionally 
capable of leaYing the hospital are: 
I 
TOTAL 100 I 
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B. Ose percentages to describe vhat you see as the chances that 
being discharged from the hospital, being placed in a suitable 
job, and beginning weekly COQnseling is the appropriate treat•ent 
recom•endation for George. 
10!! TBlT TB! PBBCEllTlG!S BOST so" TO 1001. 
Re•e•ber that you just •et with George. 
T•e chances that a hospital 4isc•arqe. a suitable 
job, and weekly counseling IS appropriate treat•ent 
for Georqe are: 
The chaaces that a hospital 4ischarge, a suitable 
job. and weekly counseling IS IDT appropriate 
treataent for George are: ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
_1 
I 
TOTlL 100 I 
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9. You have just co•plete~ the interview with George and you are 
considering various treat•ent options. Jou are considering , as 
Dr. "· did, the possibility of reco•mending that George be 
discharged from the hospital to begin a new job and weekly 
outpatient counseling. If you decide to •ake this reco•mendation, 
what do you think the chances are that the following scenario will 
occur? PLEASE CIRCLE ONE OF TRE PEPCENTAGES OM TRE SCALE BELOW. 
The new job and the weekly coaaseling sessioas will laelp 
greatly to build George's confideace aad sense of well-being. 
George will becoae increasiagly secure about functioniag 
in society and his physical syaptoas will subside. 
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OCCOBBIIG 
CllTlII OP 
OCCUllIIG 
01 101 201 301 501 601 701 801 901 1001 
10.You are still considering. as Dr. ft. did. the possiblity of 
recommending that George be discharged fro• the hospital to beqin 
a new job and veekly outpatient counseling. If you decide to aate 
this recomaendation, what do you think the chances are that the 
following scenario vill occur? (Please circle a number fro• the 
scale l:ielov) 
I••ediately after beinq discliarqed fro• the hospital. Geor9e 
will becoae oYer•helaed vitb anxiety. George •ill be anable 
to leawe his apart•ent and will atteapt saicide. 
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11. Nov you aust evaluate the chances that EITHER scenario t 1 
or scenario 12 vill occur. YOUR PERCENTAGES ~UST so~ TO 1001. 
~fINA.B,!Q !l 
!he new job and the weekly counseling sessions will help 
greatly to build George's confidence and sense of well-being. 
George vill become incr~singly secure about functioning in 
society and bis playsical sy•pto•s will subside. 
~f!fil!IO !l 
l•aediately after being discharged fro• tbe hospital, George 
will beco•e o•ervbelaed with anxiety. George •ill be ••able 
to lea•e bis apartaent and will atteapt suiciae. 
TBE CHllCES OP SC!lllIO 11 OCCOllIIG II!: 
TB! CHllCES OP SC!llBIO 12 OCCOllIIG lB!: 
_1 
I 
!OTlL 100 I 
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12. Listed belov is Dr. ft.'s treatment recommendation followed by 
other possible treat•ent reco••endations for George. Assu•e that you 
are the clinical psychologist who interviewed George. Please rank 
all the following treatment reco••endations from: 
1=ft0ST PBEFEBBED BECO!IEIDlTIOI to 5=LElST PBEPEBIED IECOBIBIDlTIOI. 
Note that you are ranking each reco•mendation so •ake sure that each 
recosmendation gets a nu~ber from 1-5 an~ no two reco•mendations get 
the saae number. 
Be sure to read the recoa•enaations carefully so t~at yo• can 
distinguish between the•. 
Discharge George fro~ the hospital, place bi• in a 
job and weekly outpatient counseling. 
Discharge George fro• the hospital and place hi• in a 
halfvay house for 11en as a transition to living and 
working on his ovn. 
Refer George to the inpatient psychiatric unit of the 
hospital right away. 
lrrange for aore inforaation fro• George before aaking 
a definitive recommendation. 
fteet with other professionals to discuss the case before 
aaking a definitive reco••endation. 
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13. Please assign a nuaber from the scale below to each itea. 
DISlGBEE 
STIOIGLt DISlGBEE 
DISlGBB! 
SLIGHTLY 
lGB!E 
SLIGHTLY lGl!B 
STIOIGLt 
lGIZ! 
1 2 3 5 6 
George reoresented a diffic~lt case for any clinical 
psychologist. 
There vas not enough inforaation about George for Dr. ~­
to make an appropriate reco•mendation. 
Dr. e. should have discussed the case vitb other 
professionals. 
Dr. e. aade an appropriate recommend~tion. 
No matter what, Georqe should have b~en kept in the 
hospital for •ore e•otional help. 
152 
14. To achieve the full purposes of this experiaent, people were 
assigned different kinds of clinical cases. Please check the kind 
of clinical case that you read. 
A clinical case in which the treat~ent recommendation 
turned out to be very appropriate for the patient. 
A clinical case in which the treat•ent reco•mendation 
turned out to be NOT very appropriate for the patient. 
~ clinical case in which there vas no information about 
what hapoened to tte oatient after being given a treataent 
recommendation. 
TBllK 100 FOB !OUR COOP!BITIOI 
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